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Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be

of something else or related to something else, are explained by

reference to that other thing. For instance, the word 'superior' is

explained by reference to something else, for it is superiority over

something else that is meant. Similarly, the expression 'double' has

this external reference, for it is the double of something else that

is meant. So it is with everything else of this kind. There are,

moreover, other relatives, e.g. habit, disposition, perception,

knowledge, and attitude. The significance of all these is explained by

a reference to something else and in no other way. Thus, a habit is

a habit of something, knowledge is knowledge of something, attitude is

the attitude of something. So it is with all other relatives that have

been mentioned. Those terms, then, are called relative, the nature

of which is explained by reference to something else, the

preposition 'of' or some other preposition being used to indicate

the relation. Thus, one mountain is called great in comparison with

son with another; for the mountain claims this attribute by comparison

with something. Again, that which is called similar must be similar to

something else, and all other such attributes have this external

reference. It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are

particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To

lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take

their name from the aforesaid attitudes.

It is possible for relatives to have contraries. Thus virtue has a

contrary, vice, these both being relatives; knowledge, too, has a

contrary, ignorance. But this is not the mark of all relatives;

'double' and 'triple' have no contrary, nor indeed has any such term.

It also appears that relatives can admit of variation of degree. For

'like' and 'unlike', 'equal' and 'unequal', have the modifications

'more' and 'less' applied to them, and each of these is relative in

character: for the terms 'like' and 'unequal' bear 'unequal' bear a

reference to something external. Yet, again, it is not every