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existence, he knows that also to which it is related. For if he does

not know at all that to which it is related, he will not know

whether or not it is relative. This is clear, moreover, in

particular instances. If a man knows definitely that such and such a

thing is 'double', he will also forthwith know definitely that of

which it is the double. For if there is nothing definite of which he

knows it to be the double, he does not know at all that it is

double. Again, if he knows that a thing is more beautiful, it

follows necessarily that he will forthwith definitely know that also

than which it is more beautiful. He will not merely know

indefinitely that it is more beautiful than something which is less

beautiful, for this would be supposition, not knowledge. For if he

does not know definitely that than which it is more beautiful, he

can no longer claim to know definitely that it is more beautiful

than something else which is less beautiful: for it might be that

nothing was less beautiful. It is, therefore, evident that if a man

apprehends some relative thing definitely, he necessarily knows that

also definitely to which it is related.

Now the head, the hand, and such things are substances, and it is

possible to know their essential character definitely, but it does not

necessarily follow that we should know that to which they are related.

It is not possible to know forthwith whose head or hand is meant. Thus

these are not relatives, and, this being the case, it would be true to

say that no substance is relative in character. It is perhaps a

difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement

without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with

regard to details is not without advantage.






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By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be