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that either the one or the other should be present in the body,

inasmuch as it is not true to say that everybody must be white or

black. Badness and goodness, again, are predicated of man, and of many

other things, but it is not necessary that either the one quality or

the other should be present in that of which they are predicated: it

is not true to say that everything that may be good or bad must be

either good or bad. These pairs of contraries have intermediates:

the intermediates between white and black are grey, sallow, and all

the other colours that come between; the intermediate between good and

bad is that which is neither the one nor the other.

Some intermediate qualities have names, such as grey and sallow

and all the other colours that come between white and black; in

other cases, however, it is not easy to name the intermediate, but

we must define it as that which is not either extreme, as in the

case of that which is neither good nor bad, neither just nor unjust.

(iii) 'privatives' and 'Positives' have reference to the same

subject. Thus, sight and blindness have reference to the eye. It is

a universal rule that each of a pair of opposites of this type has

reference to that to which the particular 'positive' is natural. We

say that that is capable of some particular faculty or possession

has suffered privation when the faculty or possession in question is

in no way present in that in which, and at the time at which, it

should naturally be present. We do not call that toothless which has

not teeth, or that blind which has not sight, but rather that which

has not teeth or sight at the time when by nature it should. For there

are some creatures which from birth are without sight, or without

teeth, but these are not called toothless or blind.

To be without some faculty or to possess it is not the same as the

corresponding 'privative' or 'positive'. 'Sight' is a 'positive',

'blindness' a 'privative', but 'to possess sight' is not equivalent to

'sight', 'to be blind' is not equivalent to 'blindness'. Blindness

is a 'privative', to be blind is to be in a state of privation, but is

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