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substratum itself does not make itself change; e.g. neither the wood
nor the bronze causes the change of either of them, nor does the
wood manufacture a bed and the bronze a statue, but something else
is the cause of the change. And to seek this is to seek the second
cause, as we should say,-that from which comes the beginning of the
movement. Now those who at the very beginning set themselves to this
kind of inquiry, and said the substratum was one, were not at all
dissatisfied with themselves; but some at least of those who
maintain it to be one-as though defeated by this search for the second
cause-say the one and nature as a whole is unchangeable not only in
respect of generation and destruction (for this is a primitive belief,
and all agreed in it), but also of all other change; and this view
is peculiar to them. Of those who said the universe was one, then none
succeeded in discovering a cause of this sort, except perhaps
Parmenides, and he only inasmuch as he supposes that there is not only
one but also in some sense two causes. But for those who make more
elements it is more possible to state the second cause, e.g. for those
who make hot and cold, or fire and earth, the elements; for they treat
fire as having a nature which fits it to move things, and water and
earth and such things they treat in the contrary way.
When these men and the principles of this kind had had their
day, as the latter were found inadequate to generate the nature of
things men were again forced by the truth itself, as we said, to
inquire into the next kind of cause. For it is not likely either
that fire or earth or any such element should be the reason why things
manifest goodness and, beauty both in their being and in their
coming to be, or that those thinkers should have supposed it was;
nor again could it be right to entrust so great a matter to
spontaneity and chance. When one man said, then, that reason was
present-as in animals, so throughout nature-as the cause of order
and of all arrangement, he seemed like a sober man in contrast with
the random talk of his predecessors. We know that Anaxagoras certainly
adopted these views, but Hermotimus of Clazomenae is credited with
expressing them earlier. Those who thought thus stated that there is a
principle of things which is at the same time the cause of beauty, and
that sort of cause from which things acquire movement.

One might suspect that Hesiod was the first to look for such a
thing-or some one else who put love or desire among existing things as
a principle, as Parmenides, too, does; for he, in constructing the
genesis of the universe, says:-

Love first of all the Gods she planned.

And Hesiod says:-

First of all things was chaos made, and then
Broad-breasted earth...
And love, 'mid all the gods pre-eminent,

which implies that among existing things there must be from the
first a cause which will move things and bring them together. How
these thinkers should be arranged with regard to priority of discovery
let us be allowed to decide later; but since the contraries of the
various forms of good were also perceived to be present in
nature-not only order and the beautiful, but also disorder and the
ugly, and bad things in greater number than good, and ignoble things
than beautiful-therefore another thinker introduced friendship and
strife, each of the two the cause of one of these two sets of
qualities. For if we were to follow out the view of Empedocles, and
interpret it according to its meaning and not to its lisping
expression, we should find that friendship is the cause of good
things, and strife of bad. Therefore, if we said that Empedocles in

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