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Pages of Metaphysics

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in one a line, that which is in no way divisible in quantity is a
point or a unit,-that which has not position a unit, that which has
position a point.
Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in
genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in
species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the
same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related
as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are
always found when the former are; e.g. things that are one in number
are also one in species, while things that are one in species are
not all one in number; but things that are one in species are all
one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in
species but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by
analogy are not all one in genus.
Evidently 'many' will have meanings opposite to those of 'one';
some things are many because they are not continuous, others because
their matter-either the proximate matter or the ultimate-is
divisible in kind, others because the definitions which state their
essence are more than one.

Things are said to 'be' (1) in an accidental sense, (2) by their
own nature.
(1) In an accidental sense, e.g. we say 'the righteous doer is
musical', and 'the man is musical', and 'the musician is a man',
just as we say 'the musician builds', because the builder happens to
be musical or the musician to be a builder; for here 'one thing is
another' means 'one is an accident of another'. So in the cases we
have mentioned; for when we say 'the man is musical' and 'the musician
is a man', or 'he who is pale is musical' or 'the musician is pale',
the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same
thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which is,
while 'the musical is a man' means that 'musical' is an accident of
a man. (In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to be, because that
of which it is an accident is.) Thus when one thing is said in an
accidental sense to be another, this is either because both belong
to the same thing, and this is, or because that to which the attribute
belongs is, or because the subject which has as an attribute that of
which it is itself predicated, itself is.
(2) The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are
indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are
just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate
what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others
relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its
'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these. For there is
no difference between 'the man is recovering' and 'the man
recovers', nor between 'the man is walking or cutting' and 'the man
walks' or 'cuts'; and similarly in all other cases.
(3) Again, 'being' and 'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not
being' that it is not true but falses-and this alike in the case of
affirmation and of negation; e.g. 'Socrates is musical' means that
this is true, or 'Socrates is not-pale' means that this is true; but
'the diagonal of the square is not commensurate with the side' means
that it is false to say it is.
(4) Again, 'being' and 'that which is' mean that some of the
things we have mentioned 'are' potentially, others in complete
reality. For we say both of that which sees potentially and of that
which sees actually, that it is 'seeing', and both of that which can
actualize its knowledge and of that which is actualizing it, that it
knows, and both of that to which rest is already present and of that
which can rest, that it rests. And similarly in the case of
substances; we say the Hermes is in the stone, and the half of the
line is in the line, and we say of that which is not yet ripe that
it is corn. When a thing is potential and when it is not yet potential

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