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he gets thirsty; and he will get thirsty if something else happens;
and thus we shall come to that which is now present, or to some past
event. For instance, he will go out if he gets thirsty; and he will
get thirsty if he is eating pungent food; and this is either the
case or not; so that he will of necessity die, or of necessity not
die. And similarly if one jumps over to past events, the same
account will hold good; for this-I mean the past condition-is
already present in something. Everything, therefore, that will be,
will be of necessity; e.g. it is necessary that he who lives shall one
day die; for already some condition has come into existence, e.g.
the presence of contraries in the same body. But whether he is to
die by disease or by violence is not yet determined, but depends on
the happening of something else. Clearly then the process goes back to
a certain starting-point, but this no longer points to something
further. This then will be the starting-point for the fortuitous,
and will have nothing else as cause of its coming to be. But to what
sort of starting-point and what sort of cause we thus refer the
fortuitous-whether to matter or to the purpose or to the motive power,
must be carefully considered.
4

Let us dismiss accidental being; for we have sufficiently
determined its nature. But since that which is in the sense of being
true, or is not in the sense of being false, depends on combination
and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the
allocation of a pair of contradictory judgements (for the true
judgement affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined,
and denies where they are separated, while the false judgement has the
opposite of this allocation; it is another question, how it happens
that we think things together or apart; by 'together' and 'apart' I
mean thinking them so that there is no succession in the thoughts
but they become a unity); for falsity and truth are not in things-it
is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself
false-but in thought; while with regard to simple concepts and 'whats'
falsity and truth do not exist even in thought--this being so, we must
consider later what has to be discussed with regard to that which is
or is not in this sense. But since the combination and the
separation are in thought and not in the things, and that which is
in this sense is a different sort of 'being' from the things that
are in the full sense (for the thought attaches or removes either
the subject's 'what' or its having a certain quality or quantity or
something else), that which is accidentally and that which is in the
sense of being true must be dismissed. For the cause of the former
is indeterminate, and that of the latter is some affection of the
thought, and both are related to the remaining genus of being, and
do not indicate the existence of any separate class of being.
Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us consider the causes and
the principles of being itself, qua being. (It was clear in our
discussion of the various meanings of terms, that 'being' has
several meanings.)
Book VII
1

THERE are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be',
as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of
words;' for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a
'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one
of the other things that are predicated as these are. While 'being'
has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the
'what', which indicates the substance of the thing. For when we say of
what quality a thing is, we say that it is good or bad, not that it is
three cubits long or that it is a man; but when we say what it is,
we do not say 'white' or 'hot' or 'three cubits long', but 'a man'
or 'a 'god'. And all other things are said to be because they are,

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