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sense health comes from health and house from house, that with
matter from that without matter; for the medical art and the
building art are the form of health and of the house, and when I speak
of substance without matter I mean the essence.
Of the productions or processes one part is called thinking and
the other making,-that which proceeds from the starting-point and
the form is thinking, and that which proceeds from the final step of
the thinking is making. And each of the other, intermediate, things is
produced in the same way. I mean, for instance, if the subject is to
be healthy his bodily state must be made uniform. What then does being
made uniform imply? This or that. And this depends on his being made
warm. What does this imply? Something else. And this something is
present potentially; and what is present potentially is already in the
physician's power.
The active principle then and the starting point for the process
of becoming healthy is, if it happens by art, the form in the soul,
and if spontaneously, it is that, whatever it is, which starts the
making, for the man who makes by art, as in healing the starting-point
is perhaps the production of warmth (and this the physician produces
by rubbing). Warmth in the body, then, is either a part of health or
is followed (either directly or through several intermediate steps) by
something similar which is a part of health; and this, viz. that which
produces the part of health, is the limiting-point--and so too with
a house (the stones are the limiting-point here) and in all other
cases. Therefore, as the saying goes, it is impossible that anything
should be produced if there were nothing existing before. Obviously
then some part of the result will pre-exist of necessity; for the
matter is a part; for this is present in the process and it is this
that becomes something. But is the matter an element even in the
formula? We certainly describe in both ways what brazen circles are;
we describe both the matter by saying it is brass, and the form by
saying that it is such and such a figure; and figure is the
proximate genus in which it is placed. The brazen circle, then, has
its matter in its formula.
As for that out of which as matter they are produced, some
things are said, when they have been produced, to be not that but
'thaten'; e.g. the statue is not gold but golden. And a healthy man is
not said to be that from which he has come. The reason is that
though a thing comes both from its privation and from its
substratum, which we call its matter (e.g. what becomes healthy is
both a man and an invalid), it is said to come rather from its
privation (e.g. it is from an invalid rather than from a man that a
healthy subject is produced). And so the healthy subject is not said
to he an invalid, but to be a man, and the man is said to be
healthy. But as for the things whose privation is obscure and
nameless, e.g. in brass the privation of a particular shape or in
bricks and timber the privation of arrangement as a house, the thing
is thought to be produced from these materials, as in the former
case the healthy man is produced from an invalid. And so, as there
also a thing is not said to be that from which it comes, here the
statue is not said to be wood but is said by a verbal change to be
wooden, not brass but brazen, not gold but golden, and the house is
said to be not bricks but bricken (though we should not say without
qualification, if we looked at the matter carefully, even that a
statue is produced from wood or a house from bricks, because coming to
be implies change in that from which a thing comes to be, and not
permanence). It is for this reason, then, that we use this way of

Since anything which is produced is produced by something (and
this I call the starting-point of the production), and from
something (and let this be taken to be not the privation but the
matter; for the meaning we attach to this has already been explained),

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