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Metaphysics   


and since something is produced (and this is either a sphere or a
circle or whatever else it may chance to be), just as we do not make
the substratum (the brass), so we do not make the sphere, except
incidentally, because the brazen sphere is a sphere and we make the
forme. For to make a 'this' is to make a 'this' out of the
substratum in the full sense of the word. (I mean that to make the
brass round is not to make the round or the sphere, but something
else, i.e. to produce this form in something different from itself.
For if we make the form, we must make it out of something else; for
this was assumed. E.g. we make a brazen sphere; and that in the
sense that out of this, which is brass, we make this other, which is a
sphere.) If, then, we also make the substratum itself, clearly we
shall make it in the same way, and the processes of making will
regress to infinity. Obviously then the form also, or whatever we
ought to call the shape present in the sensible thing, is not
produced, nor is there any production of it, nor is the essence
produced; for this is that which is made to be in something else
either by art or by nature or by some faculty. But that there is a
brazen sphere, this we make. For we make it out of brass and the
sphere; we bring the form into this particular matter, and the
result is a brazen sphere. But if the essence of sphere in general
is to be produced, something must be produced out of something. For
the product will always have to be divisible, and one part must be
this and another that; I mean the one must be matter and the other
form. If, then, a sphere is 'the figure whose circumference is at
all points equidistant from the centre', part of this will be the
medium in which the thing made will be, and part will be in that
medium, and the whole will be the thing produced, which corresponds to
the brazen sphere. It is obvious, then, from what has been said,
that that which is spoken of as form or substance is not produced, but
the concrete thing which gets its name from this is produced, and that
in everything which is generated matter is present, and one part of
the thing is matter and the other form.
Is there, then, a sphere apart from the individual spheres or a
house apart from the bricks? Rather we may say that no 'this' would
ever have been coming to be, if this had been so, but that the
'form' means the 'such', and is not a 'this'-a definite thing; but the
artist makes, or the father begets, a 'such' out of a 'this'; and when
it has been begotten, it is a 'this such'. And the whole 'this',
Callias or Socrates, is analogous to 'this brazen sphere', but man and
animal to 'brazen sphere' in general. Obviously, then, the cause which
consists of the Forms (taken in the sense in which some maintain the
existence of the Forms, i.e. if they are something apart from the
individuals) is useless, at least with regard to comings-to-be and
to substances; and the Forms need not, for this reason at least, be
self-subsistent substances. In some cases indeed it is even obvious
that the begetter is of the same kind as the begotten (not, however,
the same nor one in number, but in form), i.e. in the case of
natural products (for man begets man), unless something happens
contrary to nature, e.g. the production of a mule by a horse. (And
even these cases are similar; for that which would be found to be
common to horse and ass, the genus next above them, has not received a
name, but it would doubtless be both in fact something like a mule.)
Obviously, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to set up a Form as a
pattern (for we should have looked for Forms in these cases if in any;
for these are substances if anything is so); the begetter is
adequate to the making of the product and to the causing of the form
in the matter. And when we have the whole, such and such a form in
this flesh and in these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they
are different in virtue of their matter (for that is different), but
the same in form; for their form is indivisible.
9

The question might be raised, why some things are produced

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