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consists of ones and because each number is measurable by one; and
it is 'many' as that which is opposed to one, not to the few. In
this sense, then, even two is many-not, however, in the sense of a
plurality which is excessive either relatively or absolutely; it is
the first plurality. But without qualification two is few; for it is
first plurality which is deficient (for this reason Anaxagoras was not
right in leaving the subject with the statement that 'all things
were together, boundless both in plurality and in smallness'-where for
'and in smallness' he should have said 'and in fewness'; for they
could not have been boundless in fewness), since it is not one, as
some say, but two, that make a few.
The one is opposed then to the many in numbers as measure to thing
measurable; and these are opposed as are the relatives which are not
from their very nature relatives. We have distinguished elsewhere
the two senses in which relatives are so called:-(1) as contraries;
(2) as knowledge to thing known, a term being called relative
because another is relative to it. There is nothing to prevent one
from being fewer than something, e.g. than two; for if one is fewer,
it is not therefore few. Plurality is as it were the class to which
number belongs; for number is plurality measurable by one, and one and
number are in a sense opposed, not as contrary, but as we have said
some relative terms are opposed; for inasmuch as one is measure and
the other measurable, they are opposed. This is why not everything
that is one is a number; i.e. if the thing is indivisible it is not
a number. But though knowledge is similarly spoken of as relative to
the knowable, the relation does not work out similarly; for while
knowledge might be thought to be the measure, and the knowable the
thing measured, the fact that all knowledge is knowable, but not all
that is knowable is knowledge, because in a sense knowledge is
measured by the knowable.-Plurality is contrary neither to the few
(the many being contrary to this as excessive plurality to plurality
exceeded), nor to the one in every sense; but in the one sense these
are contrary, as has been said, because the former is divisible and
the latter indivisible, while in another sense they are relative as
knowledge is to knowable, if plurality is number and the one is a
measure.
7

Since contraries admit of an intermediate and in some cases have
it, intermediates must be composed of the contraries. For (1) all
intermediates are in the same genus as the things between which they
stand. For we call those things intermediates, into which that which
changes must change first; e.g. if we were to pass from the highest
string to the lowest by the smallest intervals, we should come
sooner to the intermediate notes, and in colours if we were to pass
from white to black, we should come sooner to crimson and grey than to
black; and similarly in all other cases. But to change from one
genus to another genus is not possible except in an incidental way, as
from colour to figure. Intermediates, then, must be in the same
genus both as one another and as the things they stand between.
But (2) all intermediates stand between opposites of some kind;
for only between these can change take place in virtue of their own
nature (so that an intermediate is impossible between things which are
not opposite; for then there would be change which was not from one
opposite towards the other). Of opposites, contradictories admit of no
middle term; for this is what contradiction is-an opposition, one or
other side of which must attach to anything whatever, i.e. which has
no intermediate. Of other opposites, some are relative, others
privative, others contrary. Of relative terms, those which are not
contrary have no intermediate; the reason is that they are not in
the same genus. For what intermediate could there be between knowledge
and knowable? But between great and small there is one.
(3) If intermediates are in the same genus, as has been shown, and
stand between contraries, they must be composed of these contraries.

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