another which is intelligible.
It is clear also that the soul is the primary substance and the
body is matter, and man or animal is the compound of both taken
universally; and 'Socrates' or 'Coriscus', if even the soul of
Socrates may be called Socrates, has two meanings (for some mean by
such a term the soul, and others mean the concrete thing), but if
'Socrates' or 'Coriscus' means simply this particular soul and this
particular body, the individual is analogous to the universal in its
Whether there is, apart from the matter of such substances,
another kind of matter, and one should look for some substance other
than these, e.g. numbers or something of the sort, must be
considered later. For it is for the sake of this that we are trying to
determine the nature of perceptible substances as well, since in a
sense the inquiry about perceptible substances is the work of physics,
i.e. of second philosophy; for the physicist must come to know not
only about the matter, but also about the substance expressed in the
formula, and even more than about the other. And in the case of
definitions, how the elements in the formula are parts of the
definition, and why the definition is one formula (for clearly the
thing is one, but in virtue of what is the thing one, although it
has parts?),-this must be considered later.
What the essence is and in what sense it is independent, has
been stated universally in a way which is true of every case, and also
why the formula of the essence of some things contains the parts of
the thing defined, while that of others does not. And we have stated
that in the formula of the substance the material parts will not be
present (for they are not even parts of the substance in that sense,
but of the concrete substance; but of this there is in a sense a
formula, and in a sense there is not; for there is no formula of it
with its matter, for this is indefinite, but there is a formula of
it with reference to its primary substance-e.g. in the case of man the
formula of the soul-, for the substance is the indwelling form, from
which and the matter the so-called concrete substance is derived; e.g.
concavity is a form of this sort, for from this and the nose arise
'snub nose' and 'snubness'); but in the concrete substance, e.g. a
snub nose or Callias, the matter also will be present. And we have
stated that the essence and the thing itself are in some cases the
same; ie. in the case of primary substances, e.g. curvature and the
essence of curvature if this is primary. (By a 'primary' substance I
mean one which does not imply the presence of something in something
else, i.e. in something that underlies it which acts as matter.) But
things which are of the nature of matter, or of wholes that include
matter, are not the same as their essences, nor are accidental unities
like that of 'Socrates' and 'musical'; for these are the same only
by accident.

Now let us treat first of definition, in so far as we have not
treated of it in the Analytics; for the problem stated in them is
useful for our inquiries concerning substance. I mean this
problem:-wherein can consist the unity of that, the formula of which
we call a definition, as for instance, in the case of man, 'two-footed
animal'; for let this be the formula of man. Why, then, is this one,
and not many, viz. 'animal' and 'two-footed'? For in the case of 'man'
and 'pale' there is a plurality when one term does not belong to the
other, but a unity when it does belong and the subject, man, has a
certain attribute; for then a unity is produced and we have 'the
pale man'. In the present case, on the other hand, one does not
share in the other; the genus is not thought to share in its
differentiae (for then the same thing would share in contraries; for
the differentiae by which the genus is divided are contrary). And even
if the genus does share in them, the same argument applies, since
the differentiae present in man are many, e.g. endowed with feet,

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