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Nicomachean Ethics   

feeling of love to themselves. Therefore also such men do not rejoice
or grieve with themselves; for their soul is rent by faction, and one
element in it by reason of its wickedness grieves when it abstains
from certain acts, while the other part is pleased, and one draws them
this way and the other that, as if they were pulling them in pieces.
If a man cannot at the same time be pained and pleased, at all events
after a short time he is pained because he was pleased, and he could
have wished that these things had not been pleasant to him; for bad
men are laden with repentance.
Therefore the bad man does not seem to be amicably disposed even to
himself, because there is nothing in him to love; so that if to be
thus is the height of wretchedness, we should strain every nerve to
avoid wickedness and should endeavour to be good; for so and only so
can one be either friendly to oneself or a friend to another.
Goodwill is a friendly sort of relation, but is not identical with
friendship; for one may have goodwill both towards people whom one
does not know, and without their knowing it, but not friendship. This
has indeed been said already.' But goodwill is not even friendly
feeling. For it does not involve intensity or desire, whereas these
accompany friendly feeling; and friendly feeling implies intimacy
while goodwill may arise of a sudden, as it does towards competitors
in a contest; we come to feel goodwill for them and to share in their
wishes, but we would not do anything with them; for, as we said, we
feel goodwill suddenly and love them only superficially.
Goodwill seems, then, to be a beginning of friendship, as the pleasure
of the eye is the beginning of love. For no one loves if he has not
first been delighted by the form of the beloved, but he who delights
in the form of another does not, for all that, love him, but only does
so when he also longs for him when absent and craves for his presence;
so too it is not possible for people to be friends if they have not
come to feel goodwill for each other, but those who feel goodwill are
not for all that friends; for they only wish well to those for whom
they feel goodwill, and would not do anything with them nor take
trouble for them. And so one might by an extension of the term
friendship say that goodwill is inactive friendship, though when it is
prolonged and reaches the point of intimacy it becomes friendship-not
the friendship based on utility nor that based on pleasure; for
goodwill too does not arise on those terms. The man who has received a
benefit bestows goodwill in return for what has been done to him, but
in doing so is only doing what is just; while he who wishes some one
to prosper because he hopes for enrichment through him seems to have
goodwill not to him but rather to himself, just as a man is not a
friend to another if he cherishes him for the sake of some use to be
made of him. In general, goodwill arises on account of some excellence
and worth, when one man seems to another beautiful or brave or
something of the sort, as we pointed out in the case of competitors in
a contest.
Unanimity also seems to be a friendly relation. For this reason it is
not identity of opinion; for that might occur even with people who do
not know each other; nor do we say that people who have the same views
on any and every subject are unanimous, e.g. those who agree about the
heavenly bodies (for unanimity about these is not a friendly
relation), but we do say that a city is unanimous when men have the
same opinion about what is to their interest, and choose the same
actions, and do what they have resolved in common. It is about things
to be done, therefore, that people are said to be unanimous, and,
among these, about matters of consequence and in which it is possible
for both or all parties to get what they want; e.g. a city is
unanimous when all its citizens think that the offices in it should be
elective, or that they should form an alliance with Sparta, or that
Pittacus should be their ruler-at a time when he himself was also
willing to rule. But when each of two people wishes himself to have

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