On Generation and corruption
On the contrary, this is where the whole error lies. For unqualified
coming-to-be and passing-away are not effected by 'association' and
'dissociation'. They take place when a thing changes, from this to
that, as a whole. But the philosophers we are criticizing suppose that
all such change is 'alteration': whereas in fact there is a
difference. For in that which underlies the change there is a factor
corresponding to the definition and there is a material factor.
When, then, the change is in these constitutive factors, there will be
coming-to-be or passing-away: but when it is in the thing's qualities,
i.e. a change of the thing per accidents, there will be 'alteration'.
'Dissociation' and 'association' affect the thing's susceptibility
to passing-away. For if water has first been 'dissociated' into
smallish drops, air comes-to-be out of it more quickly: while, if
drops of water have first been 'associated', air comes-to-be more
slowly. Our doctrine will become clearer in the sequel.' Meantime,
so much may be taken as established-viz. that coming-to-be cannot be
'association', at least not the kind of 'association' some
philosophers assert it to be.
Now that we have established the preceding distinctions, we must
first consider whether there is anything which comes-to-be and
passes-away in the unqualified sense: or whether nothing comes-to-be
in this strict sense, but everything always comes-to-be something
and out of something-I mean, e.g. comes-to-be-healthy out of being-ill
and ill out of being-healthy, comes-to-be-small out of being big and
big out of being-small, and so on in every other instance. For if
there is to be coming-to-be without qualification, 'something'
must-without qualification-'come-to-be out of not-being', so that it
would be true to say that 'not-being is an attribute of some
things'. For qualified coming-to-be is a process out of qualified