|                   
|
On Generation and corruption   
pass-away. Nor is it possible for Empedocles to explain how they do
so, since he does not assert that Fire too (and similarly every one of
his other 'elements') possesses 'elementary constituents' of itself.
Such an assertion would commit him to doctrines like those which
Plato has set forth in the Timaeus. For although both Plato and
Leucippus postulate elementary constituents that are indivisible and
distinctively characterized by figures, there is this great difference
between the two theories: the 'indivisibles' of Leucippus (i) are
solids, while those of Plato are planes, and (ii) are characterized by
an infinite variety of figures, while the characterizing figures
employed by Plato are limited in number. Thus the 'comings-to-be'
and the 'dissociations' result from the 'indivisibles' (a) according
to Leucippus through the void and through contact (for it is at the
point of contact that each of the composite bodies is divisible),
but (b) according to Plato in virtue of contact alone, since he denies
there is a void.
Now we have discussed 'indivisible planes' in the preceding
treatise.' But with regard to the assumption of 'indivisible
solids', although we must not now enter upon a detailed study of its
consequences, the following criticisms fall within the compass of a
short digression: i. The Atomists are committed to the view that every
'indivisible' is incapable alike of receiving a sensible property (for
nothing can 'suffer action' except through the void) and of
producing one-no 'indivisible' can be, e.g. either hard or cold. Yet
it is surely a paradox that an exception is made of 'the hot'-'the
hot' being assigned as peculiar to the spherical figure: for, that
being so, its 'contrary' also ('the cold') is bound to belong to
another of the figures. If, however, these properties (heat and
cold) do belong to the 'indivisibles', it is a further paradox that
they should not possess heaviness and lightness, and hardness and
softness. And yet Democritus says 'the more any indivisible exceeds,
the heavier it is'-to which we must clearly add 'and the hotter it
|