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On Interpratation   
impossible, and from that it follows that it is not necessary; it
comes about therefore that the thing which must necessarily be need
not be; which is absurd. But again, the proposition 'it is necessary
that it should be' does not follow from the proposition 'it may be',
nor does the proposition 'it is necessary that it should not be'.
For the proposition 'it may be' implies a twofold possibility,
while, if either of the two former propositions is true, the twofold
possibility vanishes. For if a thing may be, it may also not be, but
if it is necessary that it should be or that it should not be, one
of the two alternatives will be excluded. It remains, therefore,
that the proposition 'it is not necessary that it should not be'
follows from the proposition 'it may be'. For this is true also of
that which must necessarily be.
Moreover the proposition 'it is not necessary that it should not be'
is the contradictory of that which follows from the proposition 'it
cannot be'; for 'it cannot be' is followed by 'it is impossible that
it should be' and by 'it is necessary that it should not be', and
the contradictory of this is the proposition 'it is not necessary that
it should not be'. Thus in this case also contradictory propositions
follow contradictory in the way indicated, and no logical
impossibilities occur when they are thus arranged.
It may be questioned whether the proposition 'it may be' follows
from the proposition 'it is necessary that it should be'. If not,
the contradictory must follow, namely that it cannot be, or, if a
man should maintain that this is not the contradictory, then the
proposition 'it may not be'.
Now both of these are false of that which necessarily is. At the
same time, it is thought that if a thing may be cut it may also not be
cut, if a thing may be it may also not be, and thus it would follow
that a thing which must necessarily be may possibly not be; which is
false. It is evident, then, that it is not always the case that that
which may be or may walk possesses also a potentiality in the other
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