On Interpratation   

is good, that it is good; another, a false judgement, that it is not

good; and a third, which is distinct, that it is bad. Which of these

two is contrary to the true? And if they are one and the same, which

mode of expression forms the contrary?

It is an error to suppose that judgements are to be defined as

contrary in virtue of the fact that they have contrary subjects; for

the judgement concerning a good thing, that it is good, and that

concerning a bad thing, that it is bad, may be one and the same, and

whether they are so or not, they both represent the truth. Yet the

subjects here are contrary. But judgements are not contrary because

they have contrary subjects, but because they are to the contrary

effect.

Now if we take the judgement that that which is good is good, and

another that it is not good, and if there are at the same time other

attributes, which do not and cannot belong to the good, we must

nevertheless refuse to treat as the contraries of the true judgement

those which opine that some other attribute subsists which does not

subsist, as also those that opine that some other attribute does not

subsist which does subsist, for both these classes of judgement are of

unlimited content.

Those judgements must rather be termed contrary to the true

judgements, in which error is present. Now these judgements are

those which are concerned with the starting points of generation,

and generation is the passing from one extreme to its opposite;

therefore error is a like transition.

Now that which is good is both good and not bad. The first quality

is part of its essence, the second accidental; for it is by accident

that it is not bad. But if that true judgement is most really true,

which concerns the subject's intrinsic nature, then that false

judgement likewise is most really false, which concerns its

intrinsic nature. Now the judgement that that is good is not good is a

false judgement concerning its intrinsic nature, the judgement that it