good; for this is false. In the same way, moreover, the judgement

concerning that which is good, that it is not good, is the contrary of

the judgement that it is good.

It is evident that it will make no difference if we universalize the

positive judgement, for the universal negative judgement will form the

contrary. For instance, the contrary of the judgement that

everything that is good is good is that nothing that is good is

good. For the judgement that that which is good is good, if the

subject be understood in a universal sense, is equivalent to the

judgement that whatever is good is good, and this is identical with

the judgement that everything that is good is good. We may deal

similarly with judgements concerning that which is not good.

If therefore this is the rule with judgements, and if spoken

affirmations and denials are judgements expressed in words, it is

plain that the universal denial is the contrary of the affirmation

about the same subject. Thus the propositions 'everything good is

good', 'every man is good', have for their contraries the propositions

'nothing good is good', 'no man is good'. The contradictory

propositions, on the other hand, are 'not everything good is good',

'not every man is good'.

It is evident, also, that neither true judgements nor true

propositions can be contrary the one to the other. For whereas, when

two propositions are true, a man may state both at the same time

without inconsistency, contrary propositions are those which state

contrary conditions, and contrary conditions cannot subsist at one and

the same time in the same subject.


THE END