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On Memory And Reminiscense   

the actualization of kinesis (in consciousness), and here frequency

tends to produce (the regularity of) nature. And since in the realm of

nature occurrences take place which are even contrary to nature, or

fortuitous, the same happens a fortiori in the sphere swayed by

custom, since in this sphere natural law is not similarly established.

Hence it is that (from the same starting-point) the mind receives an

impulse to move sometimes in the required direction, and at other

times otherwise, (doing the latter) particularly when something else

somehow deflects the mind from the right direction and attracts it

to itself. This last consideration explains too how it happens that,

when we want to remember a name, we remember one somewhat like it,

indeed, but blunder in reference to (i.e. in pronouncing) the one we


Thus, then, recollection takes place.

But the point of capital importance is that (for the purpose of

recollection) one should cognize, determinately or indeterminately,

the time-relation (of that which he wishes to recollect). There

is,-let it be taken as a fact,-something by which one distinguishes

a greater and a smaller time; and it is reasonable to think that one

does this in a way analogous to that in which one discerns (spacial)

magnitudes. For it is not by the mind's reaching out towards them,

as some say a visual ray from the eye does (in seeing), that one

thinks of large things at a distance in space (for even if they are

not there, one may similarly think them); but one does so by a

proportionate mental movement. For there are in the mind the like

figures and movements (i.e. 'like' to those of objects and events).

Therefore, when one thinks the greater objects, in what will his

thinking those differ from his thinking the smaller? (In nothing,)

because all the internal though smaller are as it were proportional to

the external. Now, as we may assume within a person something

proportional to the forms (of distant magnitudes), so, too, we may

doubtless assume also something else proportional to their

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