for they were accustomed to speak of their mere phantasms as facts

of their past experience, and as if remembering them. This takes place

whenever one contemplates what is not a likeness as if it were a

likeness.

Mnemonic exercises aim at preserving one's memory of something by

repeatedly reminding him of it; which implies nothing else (on the

learner's part) than the frequent contemplation of something (viz. the

'mnemonic', whatever it may be) as a likeness, and not as out of

relation.

As regards the question, therefore, what memory or remembering is,

it has now been shown that it is the state of a presentation,

related as a likeness to that of which it is a presentation; and as to

the question of which of the faculties within us memory is a function,

(it has been shown) that it is a function of the primary faculty of

sense-perception, i.e. of that faculty whereby we perceive time.



2



Next comes the subject of Recollection, in dealing with which we

must assume as fundamental the truths elicited above in our

introductory discussions. For recollection is not the 'recovery' or

'acquisition' of memory; since at the instant when one at first learns

(a fact of science) or experiences (a particular fact of sense), he

does not thereby 'recover' a memory, inasmuch as none has preceded,

nor does he acquire one ab initio. It is only at the instant when

the aforesaid state or affection (of the aisthesis or upolepsis) is

implanted in the soul that memory exists, and therefore memory is

not itself implanted concurrently with the continuous implantation

of the (original) sensory experience.

Further: at the very individual and concluding instant when first

(the sensory experience or scientific knowledge) has been completely

implanted, there is then already established in the person affected