the (sensory) affection, or the scientific knowledge (if one ought

to apply the term 'scientific knowledge' to the (mnemonic) state or

affection; and indeed one may well remember, in the 'incidental'

sense, some of the things (i.e. ta katholou) which are properly

objects of scientific knowledge); but to remember, strictly and

properly speaking, is an activity which will not be immanent until the

original experience has undergone lapse of time. For one remembers now

what one saw or otherwise experienced formerly; the moment of the

original experience and the moment of the memory of it are never

identical.

Again, (even when time has elapsed, and one can be said really to

have acquired memory, this is not necessarily recollection, for

firstly) it is obviously possible, without any present act of

recollection, to remember as a continued consequence of the original

perception or other experience; whereas when (after an interval of

obliviscence) one recovers some scientific knowledge which he had

before, or some perception, or some other experience, the state of

which we above declared to be memory, it is then, and then only,

that this recovery may amount to a recollection of any of the things

aforesaid. But, (though as observed above, remembering does not

necessarily imply recollecting), recollecting always implies

remembering, and actualized memory follows (upon the successful act of

recollecting).

But secondly, even the assertion that recollection is the

reinstatement in consciousness of something which was there before but

had disappeared requires qualification. This assertion may be true,

but it may also be false; for the same person may twice learn (from

some teacher), or twice discover (i.e. excogitate), the same fact.

Accordingly, the act of recollecting ought (in its definition) to be

distinguished from these acts; i.e. recollecting must imply in those

who recollect the presence of some spring over and above that from

which they originally learn.