distances. As, therefore, if one has (psychically) the movement in AB,
BE, he constructs in thought (i.e. knows objectively) GD, since AG and
GD bear equal ratios respectively (to AB and BE), (so he who
recollects also proceeds). Why then does he construct GD rather than
ZH? Is it not because as AG is to AB, so is O to I? These movements
therefore (sc. in AB, BE, and in O:I) he has simultaneously. But if he
wishes to construct to thought ZH, he has in mind BE in like manner as
before (when constructing GD), but now, instead of (the movements of
the ratio) O:I, he has in mind (those of the ratio K:L; for
K:L::ZA:BA. (See diagram.)
When, therefore, the 'movement' corresponding to the object and that
corresponding to its time concur, then one actually remembers. If
one supposes (himself to move in these different but concurrent
ways) without really doing so, he supposes himself to remember.
For one may be mistaken, and think that he remembers when he
really does not. But it is not possible, conversely, that when one
actually remembers he should not suppose himself to remember, but
should remember unconsciously. For remembering, as we have conceived
it, essentially implies consciousness of itself. If, however, the
movement corresponding to the objective fact takes place without
that corresponding to the time, or, if the latter takes place
without the former, one does not remember.
The movement answering to the time is of two kinds. Sometimes in
remembering a fact one has no determinate time-notion of it, no such
notion as that e.g. he did something or other on the day before
yesterday; while in other cases he has a determinate notion-of the
time. Still, even though one does not remember with actual
determination of the time, he genuinely remembers, none the less.
Persons are wont to say that they remember (something), but yet do not
know when (it occurred, as happens) whenever they do not know
determinately the exact length of time implied in the 'when'.
It has been already stated that those who have a good memory are not