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On Sense And The Sensible   



condition of perceiving them as one. For thus, and not otherwise,

the ratios of the extreme sounds are compounded into one ratio:

since we should have together the ratio, on the one hand, of Many to

Few or of Odd to Even, on the other, that of Few to Many or of Even to

Odd [and these, to be perceived together, must be unified].

If, then, the sensibles denominated co-ordinates though in different

provinces of sense (e.g. I call Sweet and White co-ordinates though in

different provinces) stand yet more aloof, and differ more, from one

another than do any sensibles in the same province; while Sweet

differs from White even more than Black does from White, it is still

less conceivable that one should discern them [viz. sensibles in

different sensory provinces whether co-ordinates or not]

coinstantaneously than sensibles which are in the same province.

Therefore, if coinstantaneous perception of the latter be

impossible, that of the former is a fortiori impossible.

Some of the writers who treat of concords assert that the sounds

combined in these do not reach us simultaneously, but only appear to

do so, their real successiveness being unnoticed whenever the time

it involves is [so small as to be] imperceptible. Is this true or not?

One might perhaps, following this up, go so far as to say that even

the current opinion that one sees and hears coinstantaneously is due

merely to the fact that the intervals of time [between the really

successive perceptions of sight and hearing] escape observation. But

this can scarcely be true, nor is it conceivable that any portion of

time should be [absolutely] imperceptible, or that any should be

absolutely unnoticeable; the truth being that it is possible to

perceive every instant of time. [This is so]; because, if it is

inconceivable that a person should, while perceiving himself or

aught else in a continuous time, be at any instant unaware of his

own existence; while, obviously, the assumption, that there is in

the time-continuum a time so small as to be absolutely

imperceptible, carries the implication that a person would, during

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