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On Sense And The Sensible   



given in their visual presentation: nay, at times an object of sight

appears indivisible, but [vision like other special senses, is

fallible respecting 'common sensibles', e.g. magnitude, and] nothing

that one sees is really indivisible. The reason of this has been

previously explained. It is clear then, from the above arguments, that

no portion of time is imperceptible.

But we must here return to the question proposed above for

discussion, whether it is possible or impossible to perceive several

objects coinstantaneously; by 'coinstantaneously' I mean perceiving

the several objects in a time one and indivisible relatively to one

another, i.e. indivisible in a sense consistent with its being all a

continuum.

First, then, is it conceivable that one should perceive the

different things coinstantaneously, but each with a different part

of the Soul? Or [must we object] that, in the first place, to begin

with the objects of one and the same sense, e.g. Sight, if we assume

it [the Soul qua exercising Sight] to perceive one colour with one

part, and another colour with a different part, it will have a

plurality of parts the same in species, [as they must be,] since the

objects which it thus perceives fall within the same genus?

Should any one [to illustrate how the Soul might have in it two

different parts specifically identical, each directed to a set of

aistheta the same in genus with that to which the other is directed]

urge that, as there are two eyes, so there may be in the Soul

something analogous, [the reply is] that of the eyes, doubtless,

some one organ is formed, and hence their actualization in

perception is one; but if this is so in the Soul, then, in so far as

what is formed of both [i.e. of any two specifically identical parts

as assumed] is one, the true perceiving subject also will be one, [and

the contradictory of the above hypothesis (of different parts of

Soul remaining engaged in simultaneous perception with one sense) is

what emerges from the analogy]; while if the two parts of Soul

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