On Sophistical Refutations   

(7) the making of more than one question into one.



5



Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any

attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its

accident. For since the same thing has many accidents there is no

necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a

thing's predicates and to their subject as well. Thus (e.g.), 'If

Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he

is a man': or 'If he be different from Socrates, and Socrates be a

man, then', they say, 'he has admitted that Coriscus is different from

a man, because it so happens (accidit) that the person from whom he

said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man'.

Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or

in a certain respect and not strictly, occur whenever an expression

used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely,

e.g. in the argument 'If what is not is the object of an opinion, then

what is not is': for it is not the same thing 'to be x' and 'to be'

absolutely. Or again, 'What is, is not, if it is not a particular kind

of being, e.g. if it is not a man.' For it is not the same thing

'not to be x' and 'not to be' at all: it looks as if it were,

because of the closeness of the expression, i.e. because 'to be x'

is but little different from 'to be', and 'not to be x' from 'not to

be'. Likewise also with any argument that turns upon the point whether

an expression is used in a certain respect or used absolutely. Thus

e.g. 'Suppose an Indian to be black all over, but white in respect

of his teeth; then he is both white and not white.' Or if both

characters belong in a particular respect, then, they say, 'contrary

attributes belong at the same time'. This kind of thing is in some

cases easily seen by any one, e.g. suppose a man were to secure the

statement that the Ethiopian is black, and were then to ask whether he