On Sophistical Refutations
(7) the making of more than one question into one.
Fallacies, then, that depend on Accident occur whenever any
attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its
accident. For since the same thing has many accidents there is no
necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a
thing's predicates and to their subject as well. Thus (e.g.), 'If
Coriscus be different from "man", he is different from himself: for he
is a man': or 'If he be different from Socrates, and Socrates be a
man, then', they say, 'he has admitted that Coriscus is different from
a man, because it so happens (accidit) that the person from whom he
said that he (Coriscus) is different is a man'.
Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or
in a certain respect and not strictly, occur whenever an expression
used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely,
e.g. in the argument 'If what is not is the object of an opinion, then
what is not is': for it is not the same thing 'to be x' and 'to be'
absolutely. Or again, 'What is, is not, if it is not a particular kind
of being, e.g. if it is not a man.' For it is not the same thing
'not to be x' and 'not to be' at all: it looks as if it were,
because of the closeness of the expression, i.e. because 'to be x'
is but little different from 'to be', and 'not to be x' from 'not to
be'. Likewise also with any argument that turns upon the point whether
an expression is used in a certain respect or used absolutely. Thus
e.g. 'Suppose an Indian to be black all over, but white in respect
of his teeth; then he is both white and not white.' Or if both
characters belong in a particular respect, then, they say, 'contrary
attributes belong at the same time'. This kind of thing is in some
cases easily seen by any one, e.g. suppose a man were to secure the
statement that the Ethiopian is black, and were then to ask whether he