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On Sophistical Refutations   
is white in respect of his teeth; and then, if he be white in that
respect, were to suppose at the conclusion of his questions that
therefore he had proved dialectically that he was both white and not
white. But in some cases it often passes undetected, viz. in all cases
where, whenever a statement is made of something in a certain respect,
it would be generally thought that the absolute statement follows as
well; and also in all cases where it is not easy to see which of the
attributes ought to be rendered strictly. A situation of this kind
arises, where both the opposite attributes belong alike: for then
there is general support for the view that one must agree absolutely
to the assertion of both, or of neither: e.g. if a thing is half white
and half black, is it white or black?
Other fallacies occur because the terms 'proof' or 'refutation' have
not been defined, and because something is left out in their
definition. For to refute is to contradict one and the same
attribute-not merely the name, but the reality-and a name that is
not merely synonymous but the same name-and to confute it from the
propositions granted, necessarily, without including in the
reckoning the original point to be proved, in the same respect and
relation and manner and time in which it was asserted. A 'false
assertion' about anything has to be defined in the same way. Some
people, however, omit some one of the said conditions and give a
merely apparent refutation, showing (e.g.) that the same thing is both
double and not double: for two is double of one, but not double of
three. Or, it may be, they show that it is both double and not
double of the same thing, but not that it is so in the same respect:
for it is double in length but not double in breadth. Or, it may be,
they show it to be both double and not double of the same thing and in
the same respect and manner, but not that it is so at the same time:
and therefore their refutation is merely apparent. One might, with
some violence, bring this fallacy into the group of fallacies
dependent on language as well.
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