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On Sophistical Refutations   
refutation, but merely appears to do so owing to ignorance of what
refutation is.
The clearest cases of all, however, are those that were previously
described' as depending upon the definition of a 'refutation': and
this is also why they were called by that name. For the appearance
of a refutation is produced because of the omission in the definition,
and if we divide fallacies in the above manner, we ought to set
'Defective definition' as a common mark upon them all.
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. For the
conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so', and this
does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it
should come about without taking into account the original point,
and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon
begging the original point.
Those that depend upon the assumption of the original point and upon
stating as the cause what is not the cause, are clearly shown to be
cases of ignoratio elenchi through the definition thereof. For the
conclusion ought to come about 'because these things are so', and this
does not happen where the premisses are not causes of it: and again it
should come about without taking into account the original point,
and this is not the case with those arguments which depend upon
begging the original point.
Those that depend upon the consequent are a branch of Accident:
for the consequent is an accident, only it differs from the accident
in this, that you may secure an admission of the accident in the
case of one thing only (e.g. the identity of a yellow thing and
honey and of a white thing and swan), whereas the consequent always
involves more than one thing: for we claim that things that are the
same as one and the same thing are also the same as one another, and
this is the ground of a refutation dependent on the consequent. It is,
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