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On Sophistical Refutations 
as is bound to follow as a consequence from our thesis, but is false
or paradoxical, we must plead the same: for the necessary consequences
are generally held to be a part of the thesis itself. Moreover,
whenever the universal has been secured not under a definite name, but
by a comparison of instances, one should say that the questioner
assumes it not in the sense in which it was granted nor in which he
proposed it in the premiss: for this too is a point upon which a
refutation often depends.
If one is debarred from these defences one must pass to the argument
that the conclusion has not been properly shown, approaching it in the
light of the aforesaid distinction between the different kinds of
fallacy.
In the case, then, of names that are used literally one is bound
to answer either simply or by drawing a distinction: the tacit
understandings implied in our statements, e.g. in answer to
questions that are not put clearly but elliptically-it is upon this
that the consequent refutation depends. For example, 'Is what
belongs to Athenians the property of Athenians?' Yes. 'And so it is
likewise in other cases. But observe; man belongs to the animal
kingdom, doesn't he?' Yes. 'Then man is the property of the animal
kingdom.' But this is a fallacy: for we say that man 'belongs to'
the animal kingdom because he is an animal, just as we say that
Lysander 'belongs to' the Spartans, because he is a Spartan. It is
evident, then, that where the premiss put forward is not clear, one
must not grant it simply.
Whenever of two things it is generally thought that if the one is
true the other is true of necessity, whereas, if the other is true,
the first is not true of necessity, one should, if asked which of them
is true, grant the smaller one: for the larger the number of
premisses, the harder it is to draw a conclusion from them. If, again,
the sophist tries to secure that has a contrary while B has not,
suppose what he says is true, you should say that each has a contrary,
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