On Sophistical Refutations   

only for the one there is no established name.

Since, again, in regard to some of the views they express, most

people would say that any one who did not admit them was telling a

falsehood, while they would not say this in regard to some, e.g. to

any matters whereon opinion is divided (for most people have no

distinct view whether the soul of animals is destructible or

immortal), accordingly (1) it is uncertain in which of two senses

the premiss proposed is usually meant-whether as maxims are (for

people call by the name of 'maxims' both true opinions and general

assertions) or like the doctrine 'the diagonal of a square is

incommensurate with its side': and moreover (2) whenever opinions

are divided as to the truth, we then have subjects of which it is very

easy to change the terminology undetected. For because of the

uncertainty in which of the two senses the premiss contains the truth,

one will not be thought to be playing any trick, while because of

the division of opinion, one will not be thought to be telling a

falsehood. Change the terminology therefore, for the change will

make the position irrefutable.

Moreover, whenever one foresees any question coming, one should

put in one's objection and have one's say beforehand: for by doing

so one is likely to embarrass the questioner most effectually.



18



Inasmuch as a proper solution is an exposure of false reasoning,

showing on what kind of question the falsity depends, and whereas

'false reasoning' has a double meaning-for it is used either if a

false conclusion has been proved, or if there is only an apparent

proof and no real one-there must be both the kind of solution just

described,' and also the correction of a merely apparent proof, so

as to show upon which of the questions the appearance depends. Thus it

comes about that one solves arguments that are properly reasoned by