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On Sophistical Refutations   

expression, the opposite will be the solution. 'Could a man give

what he has not got? 'No, not what he has not got; but he could give

it in a way in which he has not got it, e.g. one die by itself.'

Does a man know either by learning or by discovery each thing that

he knows, singly? but not the things that he knows, collectively.'

Also a man treads, perhaps, on any thing he walks through, but not

on the time he walks through. Likewise also in the case of the other



In dealing with arguments that depend on Accident, one and the

same solution meets all cases. For since it is indeterminate when an

attribute should be ascribed to a thing, in cases where it belongs

to the accident of the thing, and since in some cases it is

generally agreed and people admit that it belongs, while in others

they deny that it need belong, we should therefore, as soon as the

conclusion has been drawn, say in answer to them all alike, that there

is no need for such an attribute to belong. One must, however, be

prepared to adduce an example of the kind of attribute meant. All

arguments such as the following depend upon Accident. 'Do you know

what I am going to ask you? you know the man who is approaching', or

'the man in the mask'? 'Is the statue your work of art?' or 'Is the

dog your father?' 'Is the product of a small number with a small

number a small number?' For it is evident in all these cases that

there is no necessity for the attribute which is true of the thing's

accident to be true of the thing as well. For only to things that

are indistinguishable and one in essence is it generally agreed that

all the same attributes belong; whereas in the case of a good thing,

to be good is not the same as to be going to be the subject of a

question; nor in the case of a man approaching, or wearing a mask,

is 'to be approaching' the same thing as 'to be Coriscus', so that

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