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On Sophistical Refutations   

the consequent you should show up in the course of the argument

itself. The mode in which consequences follow is twofold. For the

argument either is that as the universal follows on its

particular-as (e.g.) 'animal' follows from 'man'-so does the

particular on its universal: for the claim is made that if A is always

found with B, then B also is always found with A. Or else it

proceeds by way of the opposites of the terms involved: for if A

follows B, it is claimed that A's opposite will follow B's opposite.

On this latter claim the argument of Melissus also depends: for he

claims that because that which has come to be has a beginning, that

which has not come to be has none, so that if the heaven has not

come to be, it is also eternal. But that is not so; for the sequence

is vice versa.


In the case of any refutations whose reasoning depends on some

addition, look and see if upon its subtraction the absurdity follows

none the less: and then if so, the answerer should point this out, and

say that he granted the addition not because he really thought it, but

for the sake of the argument, whereas the questioner has not used it

for the purpose of his argument at all.


To meet those refutations which make several questions into one, one

should draw a distinction between them straight away at the start. For

a question must be single to which there is a single answer, so that

one must not affirm or deny several things of one thing, nor one thing

of many, but one of one. But just as in the case of ambiguous terms,

an attribute belongs to a term sometimes in both its senses, and

sometimes in neither, so that a simple answer does one, as it happens,

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