Physics   

the reason why they use the phrase 'all things were together' and the
coming into being of such and such a kind of thing is reduced to
change of quality, while some spoke of combination and separation.
Moreover, the fact that the contraries proceed from each other led
them to the conclusion. The one, they reasoned, must have already
existed in the other; for since everything that comes into being must
arise either from what is or from what is not, and it is impossible
for it to arise from what is not (on this point all the physicists
agree), they thought that the truth of the alternative necessarily
followed, namely that things come into being out of existent things,
i.e. out of things already present, but imperceptible to our senses
because of the smallness of their bulk. So they assert that everything
has been mixed in every. thing, because they saw everything arising
out of everything. But things, as they say, appear different from one
another and receive different names according to the nature of the
particles which are numerically predominant among the innumerable
constituents of the mixture. For nothing, they say, is purely and
entirely white or black or sweet, bone or flesh, but the nature of a
thing is held to be that of which it contains the most.
Now (1) the infinite qua infinite is unknowable, so that what is
infinite in multitude or size is unknowable in quantity, and what is
infinite in variety of kind is unknowable in quality. But the
principles in question are infinite both in multitude and in kind.
Therefore it is impossible to know things which are composed of them;
for it is when we know the nature and quantity of its components that
we suppose we know a complex.
Further (2) if the parts of a whole may be of any size in the
direction either of greatness or of smallness (by 'parts' I mean
components into which a whole can be divided and which are actually
present in it), it is necessary that the whole thing itself may be of
any size. Clearly, therefore, since it is impossible for an animal or
plant to be indefinitely big or small, neither can its parts be such,
or the whole will be the same. But flesh, bone, and the like are the
parts of animals, and the fruits are the parts of plants. Hence it is
obvious that neither flesh, bone, nor any such thing can be of
indefinite size in the direction either of the greater or of the less.
Again (3) according to the theory all such things are already present
in one another and do not come into being but are constituents which
are separated out, and a thing receives its designation from its chief
constituent. Further, anything may come out of anything-water by
segregation from flesh and flesh from water. Hence, since every finite
body is exhausted by the repeated abstraction of a finite body, it
seems obviously to follow that everything cannot subsist in everything
else. For let flesh be extracted from water and again more flesh be
produced from the remainder by repeating the process of separation:
then, even though the quantity separated out will continually
decrease, still it will not fall below a certain magnitude. If,
therefore, the process comes to an end, everything will not be in
everything else (for there will be no flesh in the remaining water);
if on the other hand it does not, and further extraction is always
possible, there will be an infinite multitude of finite equal
particles in a finite quantity-which is impossible. Another proof may
be added: Since every body must diminish in size when something is
taken from it, and flesh is quantitatively definite in respect both of
greatness and smallness, it is clear that from the minimum quantity of
flesh no body can be separated out; for the flesh left would be less
than the minimum of flesh.
Lastly (4) in each of his infinite bodies there would be already
present infinite flesh and blood and brain- having a distinct
existence, however, from one another, and no less real than the
infinite bodies, and each infinite: which is contrary to reason.
The statement that complete separation never will take place is
correct enough, though Anaxagoras is not fully aware of what it means.
For affections are indeed inseparable. If then colours and states had