Politics   

Part I
Every tate is a community of some kind, and every community is
established with a view to some good; for mankind always act in order
to obtain that which they think good. But, if all communities aim at
some good, the state or political community, which is the highest of
all, and which embraces all the rest, aims at good in a greater degree
than any other, and at the highest good.
Some people think that the qualifications of a statesman, king,
householder, and master are the same, and that they differ, not in
kind, but only in the number of their subjects. For example, the ruler
over a few is called a master; over more, the manager of a household;
over a still larger number, a statesman or king, as if there were no
difference between a great household and a small state. The
distinction which is made between the king and the statesman is as
follows: When the government is personal, the ruler is a king; when,
according to the rules of the political science, the citizens rule and
are ruled in turn, then he is called a statesman.
But all this is a mistake; for governments differ in kind, as will be
evident to any one who considers the matter according to the method
which has hitherto guided us. As in other departments of science, so
in politics, the compound should always be resolved into the simple
elements or least parts of the whole. We must therefore look at the
elements of which the state is composed, in order that we may see in
what the different kinds of rule differ from one another, and whether
any scientific result can be attained about each one of them.
Part II
He who thus considers things in their first growth and origin, whether
a state or anything else, will obtain the clearest view of them. In
the first place there must be a union of those who cannot exist
without each other; namely, of male and female, that the race may
continue (and this is a union which is formed, not of deliberate
purpose, but because, in common with other animals and with plants,
mankind have a natural desire to leave behind them an image of
themselves), and of natural ruler and subject, that both may be
preserved. For that which can foresee by the exercise of mind is by
nature intended to be lord and master, and that which can with its
body give effect to such foresight is a subject, and by nature a
slave; hence master and slave have the same interest. Now nature has
distinguished between the female and the slave. For she is not
niggardly, like the smith who fashions the Delphian knife for many
uses; she makes each thing for a single use, and every instrument is
best made when intended for one and not for many uses. But among
barbarians no distinction is made between women and slaves, because
there is no natural ruler among them: they are a community of slaves,
male and female. Wherefore the poets say,
"It is meet that Hellenes should rule over barbarians; "
as if they thought that the barbarian and the slave were by nature
one.
Out of these two relationships between man and woman, master and
slave, the first thing to arise is the family, and Hesiod is right
when he says,
"First house and wife and an ox for the plough, "
for the ox is the poor man's slave. The family is the association
established by nature for the supply of men's everyday wants, and the
members of it are called by Charondas 'companions of the cupboard,'
and by Epimenides the Cretan, 'companions of the manger.' But when
several families are united, and the association aims at something
more than the supply of daily needs, the first society to be formed is
the village. And the most natural form of the village appears to be
that of a colony from the family, composed of the children and
grandchildren, who are said to be suckled 'with the same milk.' And
this is the reason why Hellenic states were originally governed by
kings; because the Hellenes were under royal rule before they came