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Politics   
and some not. That they should have nothing in common is clearly
impossible, for the constitution is a community, and must at any rate
have a common place- one city will be in one place, and the citizens
are those who share in that one city. But should a well ordered state
have all things, as far as may be, in common, or some only and not
others? For the citizens might conceivably have wives and children and
property in common, as Socrates proposes in the Republic of Plato.
Which is better, our present condition, or the proposed new order of
society.
Part II
There are many difficulties in the community of women. And the
principle on which Socrates rests the necessity of such an institution
evidently is not established by his arguments. Further, as a means to
the end which he ascribes to the state, the scheme, taken literally is
impracticable, and how we are to interpret it is nowhere precisely
stated. I am speaking of the premise from which the argument of
Socrates proceeds, 'that the greater the unity of the state the
better.' Is it not obvious that a state may at length attain such a
degree of unity as to be no longer a state? since the nature of a
state is to be a plurality, and in tending to greater unity, from
being a state, it becomes a family, and from being a family, an
individual; for the family may be said to be more than the state, and
the individual than the family. So that we ought not to attain this
greatest unity even if we could, for it would be the destruction of
the state. Again, a state is not made up only of so many men, but of
different kinds of men; for similars do not constitute a state. It is
not like a military alliance The usefulness of the latter depends upon
its quantity even where there is no difference in quality (for mutual
protection is the end aimed at), just as a greater weight of anything
is more useful than a less (in like manner, a state differs from a
nation, when the nation has not its population organized in villages,
but lives an Arcadian sort of life); but the elements out of which a
unity is to be formed differ in kind. Wherefore the principle of
compensation, as I have already remarked in the Ethics, is the
salvation of states. Even among freemen and equals this is a principle
which must be maintained, for they cannot an rule together, but must
change at the end of a year or some other period of time or in some
order of succession. The result is that upon this plan they all
govern; just as if shoemakers and carpenters were to exchange their
occupations, and the same persons did not always continue shoemakers
and carpenters. And since it is better that this should be so in
politics as well, it is clear that while there should be continuance
of the same persons in power where this is possible, yet where this is
not possible by reason of the natural equality of the citizens, and at
the same time it is just that an should share in the government
(whether to govern be a good thing or a bad), an approximation to this
is that equals should in turn retire from office and should, apart
from official position, be treated alike. Thus the one party rule and
the others are ruled in turn, as if they were no longer the same
persons. In like manner when they hold office there is a variety in
the offices held. Hence it is evident that a city is not by nature one
in that sense which some persons affirm; and that what is said to be
the greatest good of cities is in reality their destruction; but
surely the good of things must be that which preserves them. Again, in
another point of view, this extreme unification of the state is
clearly not good; for a family is more self-sufficing than an
individual, and a city than a family, and a city only comes into being
when the community is large enough to be self-sufficing. If then
self-sufficiency is to be desired, the lesser degree of unity is more
desirable than the greater.
Part III
But, even supposing that it were best for the community to have the
greatest degree of unity, this unity is by no means proved to follow
from the fact 'of all men saying "mine" and "not mine" at the same
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