Politics   

Again, the council of elders is not free from defects. It may be said
that the elders are good men and well trained in manly virtue; and
that, therefore, there is an advantage to the state in having them.
But that judges of important causes should hold office for life is a
disputable thing, for the mind grows old as well as the body. And when
men have been educated in such a manner that even the legislator
himself cannot trust them, there is real danger. Many of the elders
are well known to have taken bribes and to have been guilty of
partiality in public affairs. And therefore they ought not to be
irresponsible; yet at Sparta they are so. But (it may be replied),
'All magistracies are accountable to the Ephors.' Yes, but this
prerogative is too great for them, and we maintain that the control
should be exercised in some other manner. Further, the mode in which
the Spartans elect their elders is childish; and it is improper that
the person to be elected should canvass for the office; the worthiest
should be appointed, whether he chooses or not. And here the
legislator clearly indicates the same intention which appears in other
parts of his constitution; he would have his citizens ambitious, and
he has reckoned upon this quality in the election of the elders; for
no one would ask to be elected if he were not. Yet ambition and
avarice, almost more than any other passions, are the motives of
crime.
Whether kings are or are not an advantage to states, I will consider
at another time; they should at any rate be chosen, not as they are
now, but with regard to their personal life and conduct. The
legislator himself obviously did not suppose that he could make them
really good men; at least he shows a great distrust of their virtue.
For this reason the Spartans used to join enemies with them in the
same embassy, and the quarrels between the kings were held to be
conservative of the state.
Neither did the first introducer of the common meals, called
'phiditia,' regulate them well. The entertainment ought to have been
provided at the public cost, as in Crete; but among the Lacedaemonians
every one is expected to contribute, and some of them are too poor to
afford the expense; thus the intention of the legislator is
frustrated. The common meals were meant to be a popular institution,
but the existing manner of regulating them is the reverse of popular.
For the very poor can scarcely take part in them; and, according to
ancient custom, those who cannot contribute are not allowed to retain
their rights of citizenship.
The law about the Spartan admirals has often been censured, and with
justice; it is a source of dissension, for the kings are perpetual
generals, and this office of admiral is but the setting up of another
king.
The charge which Plato brings, in the Laws, against the intention of
the legislator, is likewise justified; the whole constitution has
regard to one part of virtue only- the virtue of the soldier, which
gives victory in war. So long as they were at war, therefore, their
power was preserved, but when they had attained empire they fell for
of the arts of peace they knew nothing, and had never engaged in any
employment higher than war. There is another error, equally great,
into which they have fallen. Although they truly think that the goods
for which men contend are to be acquired by virtue rather than by
vice, they err in supposing that these goods are to be preferred to
the virtue which gains them.
Once more: the revenues of the state are ill-managed; there is no
money in the treasury, although they are obliged to carry on great
wars, and they are unwilling to pay taxes. The greater part of the
land being in the hands of the Spartans, they do not look closely into
one another's contributions. The result which the legislator has
produced is the reverse of beneficial; for he has made his city poor,
and his citizens greedy.
Enough respecting the Spartan constitution, of which these are the
principal defects.