Politics   

form of government changes.
Part IV
There is a point nearly allied to the preceding: Whether the virtue of
a good man and a good citizen is the same or not. But, before entering
on this discussion, we must certainly first obtain some general notion
of the virtue of the citizen. Like the sailor, the citizen is a member
of a community. Now, sailors have different functions, for one of them
is a rower, another a pilot, and a third a look-out man, a fourth is
described by some similar term; and while the precise definition of
each individual's virtue applies exclusively to him, there is, at the
same time, a common definition applicable to them all. For they have
all of them a common object, which is safety in navigation. Similarly,
one citizen differs from another, but the salvation of the community
is the common business of them all. This community is the
constitution; the virtue of the citizen must therefore be relative to
the constitution of which he is a member. If, then, there are many
forms of government, it is evident that there is not one single virtue
of the good citizen which is perfect virtue. But we say that the good
man is he who has one single virtue which is perfect virtue. Hence it
is evident that the good citizen need not of necessity possess the
virtue which makes a good man.
The same question may also be approached by another road, from a
consideration of the best constitution. If the state cannot be
entirely composed of good men, and yet each citizen is expected to do
his own business well, and must therefore have virtue, still inasmuch
as all the citizens cannot be alike, the virtue of the citizen and of
the good man cannot coincide. All must have the virtue of the good
citizen- thus, and thus only, can the state be perfect; but they will
not have the virtue of a good man, unless we assume that in the good
state all the citizens must be good.
Again, the state, as composed of unlikes, may be compared to the
living being: as the first elements into which a living being is
resolved are soul and body, as soul is made up of rational principle
and appetite, the family of husband and wife, property of master and
slave, so of all these, as well as other dissimilar elements, the
state is composed; and, therefore, the virtue of all the citizens
cannot possibly be the same, any more than the excellence of the
leader of a chorus is the same as that of the performer who stands by
his side. I have said enough to show why the two kinds of virtue
cannot be absolutely and always the same.
But will there then be no case in which the virtue of the good citizen
and the virtue of the good man coincide? To this we answer that the
good ruler is a good and wise man, and that he who would be a
statesman must be a wise man. And some persons say that even the
education of the ruler should be of a special kind; for are not the
children of kings instructed in riding and military exercises? As
Euripides says:
"No subtle arts for me, but what the state requires. "
As though there were a special education needed by a ruler. If then
the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man, and we
assume further that the subject is a citizen as well as the ruler, the
virtue of the good citizen and the virtue of the good man cannot be
absolutely the same, although in some cases they may; for the virtue
of a ruler differs from that of a citizen. It was the sense of this
difference which made Jason say that 'he felt hungry when he was not a
tyrant,' meaning that he could not endure to live in a private
station. But, on the other hand, it may be argued that men are praised
for knowing both how to rule and how to obey, and he is said to be a
citizen of approved virtue who is able to do both. Now if we suppose
the virtue of a good man to be that which rules, and the virtue of the
citizen to include ruling and obeying, it cannot be said that they are
equally worthy of praise. Since, then, it is sometimes thought that
the ruler and the ruled must learn different things and not the same,
but that the citizen must know and share in them both, the inference