Politics   

is obvious. There is, indeed, the rule of a master, which is concerned
with menial offices- the master need not know how to perform these,
but may employ others in the execution of them: the other would be
degrading; and by the other I mean the power actually to do menial
duties, which vary much in character and are executed by various
classes of slaves, such, for example, as handicraftsmen, who, as their
name signifies, live by the labor of their hands: under these the
mechanic is included. Hence in ancient times, and among some nations,
the working classes had no share in the government- a privilege which
they only acquired under the extreme democracy. Certainly the good man
and the statesman and the good citizen ought not to learn the crafts
of inferiors except for their own occasional use; if they habitually
practice them, there will cease to be a distinction between master and
slave.
This is not the rule of which we are speaking; but there is a rule of
another kind, which is exercised over freemen and equals by birth -a
constitutional rule, which the ruler must learn by obeying, as he
would learn the duties of a general of cavalry by being under the
orders of a general of cavalry, or the duties of a general of infantry
by being under the orders of a general of infantry, and by having had
the command of a regiment and of a company. It has been well said that
'he who has never learned to obey cannot be a good commander.' The two
are not the same, but the good citizen ought to be capable of both; he
should know how to govern like a freeman, and how to obey like a
freeman- these are the virtues of a citizen. And, although the
temperance and justice of a ruler are distinct from those of a
subject, the virtue of a good man will include both; for the virtue of
the good man who is free and also a subject, e.g., his justice, will
not be one but will comprise distinct kinds, the one qualifying him to
rule, the other to obey, and differing as the temperance and courage
of men and women differ. For a man would be thought a coward if he had
no more courage than a courageous woman, and a woman would be thought
loquacious if she imposed no more restraint on her conversation than
the good man; and indeed their part in the management of the household
is different, for the duty of the one is to acquire, and of the other
to preserve. Practical wisdom only is characteristic of the ruler: it
would seem that all other virtues must equally belong to ruler and
subject. The virtue of the subject is certainly not wisdom, but only
true opinion; he may be compared to the maker of the flute, while his
master is like the flute-player or user of the flute.
From these considerations may be gathered the answer to the question,
whether the virtue of the good man is the same as that of the good
citizen, or different, and how far the same, and how far different.
Part V
There still remains one more question about the citizen: Is he only a
true citizen who has a share of office, or is the mechanic to be
included? If they who hold no office are to be deemed citizens, not
every citizen can have this virtue of ruling and obeying; for this man
is a citizen And if none of the lower class are citizens, in which
part of the state are they to be placed? For they are not resident
aliens, and they are not foreigners. May we not reply, that as far as
this objection goes there is no more absurdity in excluding them than
in excluding slaves and freedmen from any of the above-mentioned
classes? It must be admitted that we cannot consider all those to be
citizens who are necessary to the existence of the state; for example,
children are not citizen equally with grown-up men, who are citizens
absolutely, but children, not being grown up, are only citizens on a
certain assumption. Nay, in ancient times, and among some nations the
artisan class were slaves or foreigners, and therefore the majority of
them are so now. The best form of state will not admit them to
citizenship; but if they are admitted, then our definition of the
virtue of a citizen will not apply to every citizen nor to every free
man as such, but only to those who are freed from necessary services.
The necessary people are either slaves who minister to the wants of