Politics   

state: Is it the multitude? Or the wealthy? Or the good? Or the one
best man? Or a tyrant? Any of these alternatives seems to involve
disagreeable consequences. If the poor, for example, because they are
more in number, divide among themselves the property of the rich- is
not this unjust? No, by heaven (will be the reply), for the supreme
authority justly willed it. But if this is not injustice, pray what
is? Again, when in the first division all has been taken, and the
majority divide anew the property of the minority, is it not evident,
if this goes on, that they will ruin the state? Yet surely, virtue is
not the ruin of those who possess her, nor is justice destructive of a
state; and therefore this law of confiscation clearly cannot be just.
If it were, all the acts of a tyrant must of necessity be just; for he
only coerces other men by superior power, just as the multitude coerce
the rich. But is it just then that the few and the wealthy should be
the rulers? And what if they, in like manner, rob and plunder the
people- is this just? if so, the other case will likewise be just. But
there can be no doubt that all these things are wrong and unjust.
Then ought the good to rule and have supreme power? But in that case
everybody else, being excluded from power, will be dishonored. For the
offices of a state are posts of honor; and if one set of men always
holds them, the rest must be deprived of them. Then will it be well
that the one best man should rule? Nay, that is still more
oligarchical, for the number of those who are dishonored is thereby
increased. Some one may say that it is bad in any case for a man,
subject as he is to all the accidents of human passion, to have the
supreme power, rather than the law. But what if the law itself be
democratical or oligarchical, how will that help us out of our
difficulties? Not at all; the same consequences will follow.
Part XI
Most of these questions may be reserved for another occasion. The
principle that the multitude ought to be supreme rather than the few
best is one that is maintained, and, though not free from difficulty,
yet seems to contain an element of truth. For the many, of whom each
individual is but an ordinary person, when they meet together may very
likely be better than the few good, if regarded not individually but
collectively, just as a feast to which many contribute is better than
a dinner provided out of a single purse. For each individual among the
many has a share of virtue and prudence, and when they meet together,
they become in a manner one man, who has many feet, and hands, and
senses; that is a figure of their mind and disposition. Hence the many
are better judges than a single man of music and poetry; for some
understand one part, and some another, and among them they understand
the whole. There is a similar combination of qualities in good men,
who differ from any individual of the many, as the beautiful are said
to differ from those who are not beautiful, and works of art from
realities, because in them the scattered elements are combined,
although, if taken separately, the eye of one person or some other
feature in another person would be fairer than in the picture. Whether
this principle can apply to every democracy, and to all bodies of men,
is not clear. Or rather, by heaven, in some cases it is impossible of
application; for the argument would equally hold about brutes; and
wherein, it will be asked, do some men differ from brutes? But there
may be bodies of men about whom our statement is nevertheless true.
And if so, the difficulty which has been already raised, and also
another which is akin to it -viz., what power should be assigned to
the mass of freemen and citizens, who are not rich and have no
personal merit- are both solved. There is still a danger in aflowing
them to share the great offices of state, for their folly will lead
them into error, and their dishonesty into crime. But there is a
danger also in not letting them share, for a state in which many poor
men are excluded from office will necessarily be full of enemies. The
only way of escape is to assign to them some deliberative and judicial
functions. For this reason Solon and certain other legislators give
them the power of electing to offices, and of calling the magistrates