Prior Analytics - Book II   

then D is subordinate to C, clearly B does not belong to it. But

that B does not belong to what is subordinate to A is not clear by

means of the syllogism. And yet B does not belong to E, if E is

subordinate to A. But while it has been proved through the syllogism

that B belongs to no C, it has been assumed without proof that B

does not belong to A, consequently it does not result through the

syllogism that B does not belong to E.

But in particular syllogisms there will be no necessity of inferring

what is subordinate to the conclusion (for a syllogism does not result

when this premiss is particular), but whatever is subordinate to the

middle term may be inferred, not however through the syllogism, e.g.

if A belongs to all B and B to some C. Nothing can be inferred about

that which is subordinate to C; something can be inferred about that

which is subordinate to B, but not through the preceding syllogism.

Similarly in the other figures. That which is subordinate to the

conclusion cannot be proved; the other subordinate can be proved, only

not through the syllogism, just as in the universal syllogisms what is

subordinate to the middle term is proved (as we saw) from a premiss

which is not demonstrated: consequently either a conclusion is not

possible in the case of universal syllogisms or else it is possible

also in the case of particular syllogisms.



2



It is possible for the premisses of the syllogism to be true, or

to be false, or to be the one true, the other false. The conclusion is

either true or false necessarily. From true premisses it is not

possible to draw a false conclusion, but a true conclusion may be

drawn from false premisses, true however only in respect to the

fact, not to the reason. The reason cannot be established from false

premisses: why this is so will be explained in the sequel.

First then that it is not possible to draw a false conclusion from