Rhetoric   

present-day writers on rhetoric direct the whole of their efforts.
This subject shall be treated in detail when we come to speak of the
emotions. Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself
when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the
persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question.
There are, then, these three means of effecting persuasion. The man
who is to be in command of them must, it is clear, be able (1) to
reason logically, (2) to understand human character and goodness in
their various forms, and (3) to understand the emotions-that is, to
name them and describe them, to know their causes and the way in which
they are excited. It thus appears that rhetoric is an offshoot of
dialectic and also of ethical studies. Ethical studies may fairly be
called political; and for this reason rhetoric masquerades as
political science, and the professors of it as political
experts-sometimes from want of education, sometimes from ostentation,
sometimes owing to other human failings. As a matter of fact, it is a
branch of dialectic and similar to it, as we said at the outset.
Neither rhetoric nor dialectic is the scientific study of any one
separate subject: both are faculties for providing arguments. This is
perhaps a sufficient account of their scope and of how they are
related to each other.
With regard to the persuasion achieved by proof or apparent proof:
just as in dialectic there is induction on the one hand and syllogism
or apparent syllogism on the other, so it is in rhetoric. The example
is an induction, the enthymeme is a syllogism, and the apparent
enthymeme is an apparent syllogism. I call the enthymeme a rhetorical
syllogism, and the example a rhetorical induction. Every one who
effects persuasion through proof does in fact use either enthymemes or
examples: there is no other way. And since every one who proves
anything at all is bound to use either syllogisms or inductions (and
this is clear to us from the Analytics), it must follow that
enthymemes are syllogisms and examples are inductions. The difference
between example and enthymeme is made plain by the passages in the
Topics where induction and syllogism have already been discussed. When
we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this
is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric; when it is shown that,
certain propositions being true, a further and quite distinct
proposition must also be true in consequence, whether invariably or
usually, this is called syllogism in dialectic, enthymeme in rhetoric.
It is plain also that each of these types of oratory has its
advantages. Types of oratory, I say: for what has been said in the
Methodics applies equally well here; in some oratorical styles
examples prevail, in others enthymemes; and in like manner, some
orators are better at the former and some at the latter. Speeches that
rely on examples are as persuasive as the other kind, but those which
rely on enthymemes excite the louder applause. The sources of examples
and enthymemes, and their proper uses, we will discuss later. Our next
step is to define the processes themselves more clearly.
A statement is persuasive and credible either because it is directly
self-evident or because it appears to be proved from other statements
that are so. In either case it is persuasive because there is somebody
whom it persuades. But none of the arts theorize about individual
cases. Medicine, for instance, does not theorize about what will help
to cure Socrates or Callias, but only about what will help to cure any
or all of a given class of patients: this alone is business:
individual cases are so infinitely various that no systematic
knowledge of them is possible. In the same way the theory of rhetoric
is concerned not with what seems probable to a given individual like
Socrates or Hippias, but with what seems probable to men of a given
type; and this is true of dialectic also. Dialectic does not construct
its syllogisms out of any haphazard materials, such as the fancies of
crazy people, but out of materials that call for discussion; and
rhetoric, too, draws upon the regular subjects of debate. The duty of
rhetoric is to deal with such matters as we deliberate upon without