Rhetoric   

fact based upon these particular or special Lines of Argument;
comparatively few on the common or general kind. As in the therefore,
so in this work, we must distinguish, in dealing with enthymemes, the
special and the general Lines of Argument on which they are to be
founded. By special Lines of Argument I mean the propositions peculiar
to each several class of things, by general those common to all
classes alike. We may begin with the special Lines of Argument. But,
first of all, let us classify rhetoric into its varieties. Having
distinguished these we may deal with them one by one, and try to
discover the elements of which each is composed, and the propositions
each must employ.
Part 3
Rhetoric falls into three divisions, determined by the three classes
of listeners to speeches. For of the three elements in
speech-making--speaker, subject, and person addressed--it is the last
one, the hearer, that determines the speech's end and object. The
hearer must be either a judge, with a decision to make about things
past or future, or an observer. A member of the assembly decides about
future events, a juryman about past events: while those who merely
decide on the orator's skill are observers. From this it follows that
there are three divisions of oratory-(1) political, (2) forensic, and
(3) the ceremonial oratory of display.
Political speaking urges us either to do or not to do something: one
of these two courses is always taken by private counsellors, as well
as by men who address public assemblies. Forensic speaking either
attacks or defends somebody: one or other of these two things must
always be done by the parties in a case. The ceremonial oratory of
display either praises or censures somebody. These three kinds of
rhetoric refer to three different kinds of time. The political orator
is concerned with the future: it is about things to be done hereafter
that he advises, for or against. The party in a case at law is
concerned with the past; one man accuses the other, and the other
defends himself, with reference to things already done. The ceremonial
orator is, properly speaking, concerned with the present, since all
men praise or blame in view of the state of things existing at the
time, though they often find it useful also to recall the past and to
make guesses at the future.
Rhetoric has three distinct ends in view, one for each of its three
kinds. The political orator aims at establishing the expediency or the
harmfulness of a proposed course of action; if he urges its
acceptance, he does so on the ground that it will do good; if he urges
its rejection, he does so on the ground that it will do harm; and all
other points, such as whether the proposal is just or unjust,
honourable or dishonourable, he brings in as subsidiary and relative
to this main consideration. Parties in a law-case aim at establishing
the justice or injustice of some action, and they too bring in all
other points as subsidiary and relative to this one. Those who praise
or attack a man aim at proving him worthy of honour or the reverse,
and they too treat all other considerations with reference to this
one.
That the three kinds of rhetoric do aim respectively at the three ends
we have mentioned is shown by the fact that speakers will sometimes
not try to establish anything else. Thus, the litigant will sometimes
not deny that a thing has happened or that he has done harm. But that
he is guilty of injustice he will never admit; otherwise there would
be no need of a trial. So too, political orators often make any
concession short of admitting that they are recommending their hearers
to take an inexpedient course or not to take an expedient one. The
question whether it is not unjust for a city to enslave its innocent
neighbours often does not trouble them at all. In like manner those
who praise or censure a man do not consider whether his acts have been
expedient or not, but often make it a ground of actual praise that he
has neglected his own interest to do what was honourable. Thus, they
praise Achilles because he championed his fallen friend Patroclus,