Rhetoric   

and the like, as being bodily excellences and productive of many other
good things: for instance, health is productive both of pleasure and
of life, and therefore is thought the greatest of goods, since these
two things which it causes, pleasure and life, are two of the things
most highly prized by ordinary people. Wealth, again: for it is the
excellence of possession, and also productive of many other good
things. Friends and friendship: for a friend is desirable in himself
and also productive of many other good things. So, too, honour and
reputation, as being pleasant, and productive of many other good
things, and usually accompanied by the presence of the good things
that cause them to be bestowed. The faculty of speech and action;
since all such qualities are productive of what is good. Further-good
parts, strong memory, receptiveness, quickness of intuition, and the
like, for all such faculties are productive of what is good.
Similarly, all the sciences and arts. And life: since, even if no
other good were the result of life, it is desirable in itself. And
justice, as the cause of good to the community.
The above are pretty well all the things admittedly good. In dealing
with things whose goodness is disputed, we may argue in the following
ways:-That is good of which the contrary is bad. That is good the
contrary of which is to the advantage of our enemies; for example, if
it is to the particular advantage of our enemies that we should be
cowards, clearly courage is of particular value to our countrymen. And
generally, the contrary of that which our enemies desire, or of that
at which they rejoice, is evidently valuable. Hence the passage
beginning:
"Surely would Priam exult. "
This principle usually holds good, but not always, since it may well
be that our interest is sometimes the same as that of our enemies.
Hence it is said that 'evils draw men together'; that is, when the
same thing is hurtful to them both.
Further: that which is not in excess is good, and that which is
greater than it should be is bad. That also is good on which much
labour or money has been spent; the mere fact of this makes it seem
good, and such a good is assumed to be an end-an end reached through a
long chain of means; and any end is a good. Hence the lines beginning:
"And for Priam (and Troy-town's folk) should
"they leave behind them a boast; "
and
"Oh, it were shame
"To have tarried so long and return empty-handed
"as erst we came; "
and there is also the proverb about 'breaking the pitcher at the
door'.
That which most people seek after, and which is obviously an object of
contention, is also a good; for, as has been shown, that is good which
is sought after by everybody, and 'most people' is taken to be
equivalent to 'everybody'. That which is praised is good, since no one
praises what is not good. So, again, that which is praised by our
enemies [or by the worthless] for when even those who have a grievance
think a thing good, it is at once felt that every one must agree with
them; our enemies can admit the fact only because it is evident, just
as those must be worthless whom their friends censure and their
enemies do not. (For this reason the Corinthians conceived themselves
to be insulted by Simonides when he wrote:
"Against the Corinthians hath Ilium no complaint.) "
Again, that is good which has been distinguished by the favour of a
discerning or virtuous man or woman, as Odysseus was distinguished by
Athena, Helen by Theseus, Paris by the goddesses, and Achilles by
Homer. And, generally speaking, all things are good which men
deliberately choose to do; this will include the things already
mentioned, and also whatever may be bad for their enemies or good for
their friends, and at the same time practicable. Things are
'practicable' in two senses: (1) it is possible to do them, (2) it is