Rhetoric   

corresponds with that of their causes and beginnings, and conversely
the nature of causes and beginnings corresponds with that of their
results. Moreover, those things are greater goods, superiority in
which is more desirable or more honourable. Thus, keenness of sight is
more desirable than keenness of smell, sight generally being more
desirable than smell generally; and similarly, unusually great love of
friends being more honourable than unusually great love of money,
ordinary love of friends is more honourable than ordinary love of
money. Conversely, if one of two normal things is better or nobler
than the other, an unusual degree of that thing is better or nobler
than an unusual degree of the other. Again, one thing is more
honourable or better than another if it is more honourable or better
to desire it; the importance of the object of a given instinct
corresponds to the importance of the instinct itself; and for the same
reason, if one thing is more honourable or better than another, it is
more honourable and better to desire it. Again, if one science is more
honourable and valuable than another, the activity with which it deals
is also more honourable and valuable; as is the science, so is the
reality that is its object, each science being authoritative in its
own sphere. So, also, the more valuable and honourable the object of a
science, the more valuable and honourable the science itself is-in
consequence. Again, that which would be judged, or which has been
judged, a good thing, or a better thing than something else, by all or
most people of understanding, or by the majority of men, or by the
ablest, must be so; either without qualification, or in so far as they
use their understanding to form their judgement. This is indeed a
general principle, applicable to all other judgements also; not only
the goodness of things, but their essence, magnitude, and general
nature are in fact just what knowledge and understanding will declare
them to be. Here the principle is applied to judgements of goodness,
since one definition of 'good' was 'what beings that acquire
understanding will choose in any given case': from which it clearly
follows that that thing is hetter which understanding declares to be
so. That, again, is a better thing which attaches to better men,
either absolutely, or in virtue of their being better; as courage is
better than strength. And that is a greater good which would be chosen
by a better man, either absolutely, or in virtue of his being better:
for instance, to suffer wrong rather than to do wrong, for that would
be the choice of the juster man. Again, the pleasanter of two things
is the better, since all things pursue pleasure, and things
instinctively desire pleasurable sensation for its own sake; and these
are two of the characteristics by which the 'good' and the 'end' have
been defined. One pleasure is greater than another if it is more
unmixed with pain, or more lasting. Again, the nobler thing is better
than the less noble, since the noble is either what is pleasant or
what is desirable in itself. And those things also are greater goods
which men desire more earnestly to bring about for themselves or for
their friends, whereas those things which they least desire to bring
about are greater evils. And those things which are more lasting are
better than those which are more fleeting, and the more secure than
the less; the enjoyment of the lasting has the advantage of being
longer, and that of the secure has the advantage of suiting our
wishes, being there for us whenever we like. Further, in accordance
with the rule of co-ordinate terms and inflexions of the same stem,
what is true of one such related word is true of all. Thus if the
action qualified by the term 'brave' is more noble and desirable than
the action qualified by the term 'temperate', then 'bravery' is more
desirable than 'temperance' and 'being brave' than 'being temperate'.
That, again, which is chosen by all is a greater good than that which
is not, and that chosen by the majority than that chosen by the
minority. For that which all desire is good, as we have said;' and so,
the more a thing is desired, the better it is. Further, that is the
better thing which is considered so by competitors or enemies, or,
again, by authorized judges or those whom they select to represent