Rhetoric   

them. In the first two cases the decision is virtually that of every
one, in the last two that of authorities and experts. And sometimes it
may be argued that what all share is the better thing, since it is a
dishonour not to share in it; at other times, that what none or few
share is better, since it is rarer. The more praiseworthy things are,
the nobler and therefore the better they are. So with the things that
earn greater honours than others-honour is, as it were, a measure of
value; and the things whose absence involves comparatively heavy
penalties; and the things that are better than others admitted or
believed to be good. Moreover, things look better merely by being
divided into their parts, since they then seem to surpass a greater
number of things than before. Hence Homer says that Meleager was
roused to battle by the thought of
"All horrors that light on a folk whose city
"is ta'en of their foes,
"When they slaughter the men, when the burg is
"wasted with ravening flame,
"When strangers are haling young children to thraldom,
"(fair women to shame.) "
The same effect is produced by piling up facts in a climax after the
manner of Epicharmus. The reason is partly the same as in the case of
division (for combination too makes the impression of great
superiority), and partly that the original thing appears to be the
cause and origin of important results. And since a thing is better
when it is harder or rarer than other things, its superiority may be
due to seasons, ages, places, times, or one's natural powers. When a
man accomplishes something beyond his natural power, or beyond his
years, or beyond the measure of people like him, or in a special way,
or at a special place or time, his deed will have a high degree of
nobleness, goodness, and justice, or of their opposites. Hence the
epigram on the victor at the Olympic games:
"In time past, hearing a Yoke on my shoulders,
"of wood unshaven,
"I carried my loads of fish from, Argos to Tegea town. "
So Iphicrates used to extol himself by describing the low estate from
which he had risen. Again, what is natural is better than what is
acquired, since it is harder to come by. Hence the words of Homer:
"I have learnt from none but mysell. "
And the best part of a good thing is particularly good; as when
Pericles in his funeral oration said that the country's loss of its
young men in battle was 'as if the spring were taken out of the year'.
So with those things which are of service when the need is pressing;
for example, in old age and times of sickness. And of two things that
which leads more directly to the end in view is the better. So too is
that which is better for people generally as well as for a particular
individual. Again, what can be got is better than what cannot, for it
is good in a given case and the other thing is not. And what is at the
end of life is better than what is not, since those things are ends in
a greater degree which are nearer the end. What aims at reality is
better than what aims at appearance. We may define what aims at
appearance as what a man will not choose if nobody is to know of his
having it. This would seem to show that to receive benefits is more
desirable than to confer them, since a man will choose the former even
if nobody is to know of it, but it is not the general view that he
will choose the latter if nobody knows of it. What a man wants to be
is better than what a man wants to seem, for in aiming at that he is
aiming more at reality. Hence men say that justice is of small value,
since it is more desirable to seem just than to be just, whereas with
health it is not so. That is better than other things which is more
useful than they are for a number of different purposes; for example,
that which promotes life, good life, pleasure, and noble conduct. For
this reason wealth and health are commonly thought to be of the
highest value, as possessing all these advantages. Again, that is
better than other things which is accompanied both with less pain and