|                   
|
Rhetoric   
us, including those who will tell us of their own weak points: it has
just said that with our friends we are not ashamed of what is
conventionally wrong, and if we do have this feeling, we do not love
them; if therefore we do not have it, it looks as if we did love them.
We also like those with whom we do not feel frightened or
uncomfortable-nobody can like a man of whom he feels frightened.
Friendship has various forms-comradeship, intimacy, kinship, and so
on.
Things that cause friendship are: doing kindnesses; doing them
unasked; and not proclaiming the fact when they are done, which shows
that they were done for our own sake and not for some other reason.
Enmity and Hatred should clearly be studied by reference to their
opposites. Enmity may be produced by anger or spite or calumny. Now
whereas anger arises from offences against oneself, enmity may arise
even without that; we may hate people merely because of what we take
to be their character. Anger is always concerned with individuals-a
Callias or a Socrates-whereas hatred is directed also against classes:
we all hate any thief and any informer. Moreover, anger can be cured
by time; but hatred cannot. The one aims at giving pain to its object,
the other at doing him harm; the angry man wants his victims to feel;
the hater does not mind whether they feel or not. All painful things
are felt; but the greatest evils, injustice and folly, are the least
felt, since their presence causes no pain. And anger is accompanied by
pain, hatred is not; the angry man feels pain, but the hater does not.
Much may happen to make the angry man pity those who offend him, but
the hater under no circumstances wishes to pity a man whom he has once
hated: for the one would have the offenders suffer for what they have
done; the other would have them cease to exist.
It is plain from all this that we can prove people to be friends or
enemies; if they are not, we can make them out to be so; if they claim
to be so, we can refute their claim; and if it is disputed whether an
action was due to anger or to hatred, we can attribute it to whichever
of these we prefer.
Part 5
To turn next to Fear, what follows will show things and persons of
which, and the states of mind in which, we feel afraid. Fear may be
defined as a pain or disturbance due to a mental picture of some
destructive or painful evil in the future. Of destructive or painful
evils only; for there are some evils, e.g. wickedness or stupidity,
the prospect of which does not frighten us: I mean only such as amount
to great pains or losses. And even these only if they appear not
remote but so near as to be imminent: we do not fear things that are a
very long way off: for instance, we all know we shall die, but we are
not troubled thereby, because death is not close at hand. From this
definition it will follow that fear is caused by whatever we feel has
great power of destroying or of harming us in ways that tend to cause
us great pain. Hence the very indications of such things are terrible,
making us feel that the terrible thing itself is close at hand; the
approach of what is terrible is just what we mean by 'danger'. Such
indications are the enmity and anger of people who have power to do
something to us; for it is plain that they have the will to do it, and
so they are on the point of doing it. Also injustice in possession of
power; for it is the unjust man's will to do evil that makes him
unjust. Also outraged virtue in possession of power; for it is plain
that, when outraged, it always has the will to retaliate, and now it
has the power to do so. Also fear felt by those who have the power to
do something to us, since such persons are sure to be ready to do it.
And since most men tend to be bad-slaves to greed, and cowards in
danger-it is, as a rule, a terrible thing to be at another man's
mercy; and therefore, if we have done anything horrible, those in the
secret terrify us with the thought that they may betray or desert us.
And those who can do us wrong are terrible to us when we are liable to
be wronged; for as a rule men do wrong to others whenever they have
the power to do it. And those who have been wronged, or believe
|