Rhetoric   

The conditions under which we shall feel shame are these: first,
having people related to us like those before whom, as has been said,
we feel shame. These are, as was stated, persons whom we admire, or
who admire us, or by whom we wish to be admired, or from whom we
desire some service that we shall not obtain if we forfeit their good
opinion. These persons may be actually looking on (as Cydias
represented them in his speech on land assignments in Samos, when he
told the Athenians to imagine the Greeks to be standing all around
them, actually seeing the way they voted and not merely going to hear
about it afterwards): or again they may be near at hand, or may be
likely to find out about what we do. This is why in misfortune we do
not wish to be seen by those who once wished themselves like us; for
such a feeling implies admiration. And men feel shame when they have
acts or exploits to their credit on which they are bringing dishonour,
whether these are their own, or those of their ancestors, or those of
other persons with whom they have some close connexion. Generally, we
feel shame before those for whose own misconduct we should also feel
it-those already mentioned; those who take us as their models; those
whose teachers or advisers we have been; or other people, it may be,
like ourselves, whose rivals we are. For there are many things that
shame before such people makes us do or leave undone. And we feel more
shame when we are likely to be continually seen by, and go about under
the eyes of, those who know of our disgrace. Hence, when Antiphon the
poet was to be cudgelled to death by order of Dionysius, and saw those
who were to perish with him covering their faces as they went through
the gates, he said, 'Why do you cover your faces? Is it lest some of
these spectators should see you to-morrow?'
So much for Shame; to understand Shamelessness, we need only consider
the converse cases, and plainly we shall have all we need.
Part 7
To take Kindness next: the definition of it will show us towards whom
it is felt, why, and in what frames of mind. Kindness-under the
influence of which a man is said to 'be kind' may be defined as
helpfulness towards some one in need, not in return for anything, nor
for the advantage of the helper himself, but for that of the person
helped. Kindness is great if shown to one who is in great need, or who
needs what is important and hard to get, or who needs it at an
important and difficult crisis; or if the helper is the only, the
first, or the chief person to give the help. Natural cravings
constitute such needs; and in particular cravings, accompanied by
pain, for what is not being attained. The appetites are cravings for
this kind: sexual desire, for instance, and those which arise during
bodily injuries and in dangers; for appetite is active both in danger
and in pain. Hence those who stand by us in poverty or in banishment,
even if they do not help us much, are yet really kind to us, because
our need is great and the occasion pressing; for instance, the man who
gave the mat in the Lyceum. The helpfulness must therefore meet,
preferably, just this kind of need; and failing just this kind, some
other kind as great or greater. We now see to whom, why, and under
what conditions kindness is shown; and these facts must form the basis
of our arguments. We must show that the persons helped are, or have
been, in such pain and need as has been described, and that their
helpers gave, or are giving, the kind of help described, in the kind
of need described. We can also see how to eliminate the idea of
kindness and make our opponents appear unkind: we may maintain that
they are being or have been helpful simply to promote their own
interest-this, as has been stated, is not kindness; or that their
action was accidental, or was forced upon them; or that they were not
doing a favour, but merely returning one, whether they know this or
not-in either case the action is a mere return, and is therefore not a
kindness even if the doer does not know how the case stands. In
considering this subject we must look at all the categories: an act
may be an act of kindness because (1) it is a particular thing, (2) it
has a particular magnitude or (3) quality, or (4) is done at a