Rhetoric   

when the danger is near ourselves. Also we pity those who are like us
in age, character, disposition, social standing, or birth; for in all
these cases it appears more likely that the same misfortune may befall
us also. Here too we have to remember the general principle that what
we fear for ourselves excites our pity when it happens to others.
Further, since it is when the sufferings of others are close to us
that they excite our pity (we cannot remember what disasters happened
a hundred centuries ago, nor look forward to what will happen a
hundred centuries hereafter, and therefore feel little pity, if any,
for such things): it follows that those who heighten the effect of
their words with suitable gestures, tones, dress, and dramatic action
generally, are especially successful in exciting pity: they thus put
the disasters before our eyes, and make them seem close to us, just
coming or just past. Anything that has just happened, or is going to
happen soon, is particularly piteous: so too therefore are the tokens
and the actions of sufferers-the garments and the like of those who
have already suffered; the words and the like of those actually
suffering-of those, for instance, who are on the point of death. Most
piteous of all is it when, in such times of trial, the victims are
persons of noble character: whenever they are so, our pity is
especially excited, because their innocence, as well as the setting of
their misfortunes before our eyes, makes their misfortunes seem close
to ourselves.
Part 9
Most directly opposed to pity is the feeling called Indignation. Pain
at unmerited good fortune is, in one sense, opposite to pain at
unmerited bad fortune, and is due to the same moral qualities. Both
feelings are associated with good moral character; it is our duty both
to feel sympathy and pity for unmerited distress, and to feel
indignation at unmerited prosperity; for whatever is undeserved is
unjust, and that is why we ascribe indignation even to the gods. It
might indeed be thought that envy is similarly opposed to pity, on the
ground that envy it closely akin to indignation, or even the same
thing. But it is not the same. It is true that it also is a disturbing
pain excited by the prosperity of others. But it is excited not by the
prosperity of the undeserving but by that of people who are like us or
equal with us. The two feelings have this in common, that they must be
due not to some untoward thing being likely to befall ourselves, but
only to what is happening to our neighbour. The feeling ceases to be
envy in the one case and indignation in the other, and becomes fear,
if the pain and disturbance are due to the prospect of something bad
for ourselves as the result of the other man's good fortune. The
feelings of pity and indignation will obviously be attended by the
converse feelings of satisfaction. If you are pained by the unmerited
distress of others, you will be pleased, or at least not pained, by
their merited distress. Thus no good man can be pained by the
punishment of parricides or murderers. These are things we are bound
to rejoice at, as we must at the prosperity of the deserving; both
these things are just, and both give pleasure to any honest man, since
he cannot help expecting that what has happened to a man like him will
happen to him too. All these feelings are associated with the same
type of moral character. And their contraries are associated with the
contrary type; the man who is delighted by others' misfortunes is
identical with the man who envies others' prosperity. For any one who
is pained by the occurrence or existence of a given thing must be
pleased by that thing's non-existence or destruction. We can now see
that all these feelings tend to prevent pity (though they differ among
themselves, for the reasons given), so that all are equally useful for
neutralizing an appeal to pity.
We will first consider Indignation-reserving the other emotions for
subsequent discussion-and ask with whom, on what grounds, and in what
states of mind we may be indignant. These questions are really
answered by what has been said already. Indignation is pain caused by
the sight of undeserved good fortune. It is, then, plain to begin with