Rhetoric   

that there are some forms of good the sight of which cannot cause it.
Thus a man may be just or brave, or acquire moral goodness: but we
shall not be indignant with him for that reason, any more than we
shall pity him for the contrary reason. Indignation is roused by the
sight of wealth, power, and the like-by all those things, roughly
speaking, which are deserved by good men and by those who possess the
goods of nature-noble birth, beauty, and so on. Again, what is long
established seems akin to what exists by nature; and therefore we feel
more indignation at those possessing a given good if they have as a
matter of fact only just got it and the prosperity it brings with it.
The newly rich give more offence than those whose wealth is of long
standing and inherited. The same is true of those who have office or
power, plenty of friends, a fine family, &c. We feel the same when
these advantages of theirs secure them others. For here again, the
newly rich give us more offence by obtaining office through their
riches than do those whose wealth is of long standing; and so in all
other cases. The reason is that what the latter have is felt to be
really their own, but what the others have is not; what appears to
have been always what it is is regarded as real, and so the
possessions of the newly rich do not seem to be really their own.
Further, it is not any and every man that deserves any given kind of
good; there is a certain correspondence and appropriateness in such
things; thus it is appropriate for brave men, not for just men, to
have fine weapons, and for men of family, not for parvenus, to make
distinguished marriages. Indignation may therefore properly be felt
when any one gets what is not appropriate for him, though he may be a
good man enough. It may also be felt when any one sets himself up
against his superior, especially against his superior in some
particular respect-whence the lines
"Only from battle he shrank with Aias Telamon's son;
"Zeus had been angered with him,
"had he fought with a mightier one; "
but also, even apart from that, when the inferior in any sense
contends with his superior; a musician, for instance, with a just man,
for justice is a finer thing than music.
Enough has been said to make clear the grounds on which, and the
persons against whom, Indignation is felt-they are those mentioned,
and others like him. As for the people who feel it; we feel it if we
do ourselves deserve the greatest possible goods and moreover have
them, for it is an injustice that those who are not our equals should
have been held to deserve as much as we have. Or, secondly, we feel it
if we are really good and honest people; our judgement is then sound,
and we loathe any kind of injustice. Also if we are ambitious and
eager to gain particular ends, especially if we are ambitious for what
others are getting without deserving to get it. And, generally, if we
think that we ourselves deserve a thing and that others do not, we are
disposed to be indignant with those others so far as that thing is
concerned. Hence servile, worthless, unambitious persons are not
inclined to Indignation, since there is nothing they can believe
themselves to deserve.
From all this it is plain what sort of men those are at whose
misfortunes, distresses, or failures we ought to feel pleased, or at
least not pained: by considering the facts described we see at once
what their contraries are. If therefore our speech puts the judges in
such a frame of mind as that indicated and shows that those who claim
pity on certain definite grounds do not deserve to secure pity but do
deserve not to secure it, it will be impossible for the judges to feel
pity.
Part 10
To take Envy next: we can see on what grounds, against what persons,
and in what states of mind we feel it. Envy is pain at the sight of
such good fortune as consists of the good things already mentioned; we
feel it towards our equals; not with the idea of getting something for
ourselves, but because the other people have it. We shall feel it if