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'courageously' to courage; and then 'co-ordinate' describes all the
members of the same kindred series, e.g. 'justice', 'just', of a man
or an act, 'justly'. Clearly, then, when any one member, whatever its
kind, of the same kindred series is shown to be good or praiseworthy,
then all the rest as well come to be shown to be so: e.g. if 'justice'
be something praiseworthy, then so will 'just', of a man or thing, and
'justly' connote something praiseworthy. Then 'justly' will be
rendered also 'praiseworthily', derived will by the same inflexion
from 'the praiseworthy' whereby 'justly' is derived from 'justice'.
Look not only in the case of the subject mentioned, but also in the
case of its contrary, for the contrary predicate: e.g. argue that good
is not necessarily pleasant; for neither is evil painful: or that, if
the latter be the case, so is the former. Also, if justice be
knowledge, then injustice is ignorance: and if 'justly' means
'knowingly' and 'skilfully', then 'unjustly' means 'ignorantly' and
'unskilfully': whereas if the latter be not true, neither is the
former, as in the instance given just now: for 'unjustly' is more
likely to seem equivalent to 'skilfully' than to 'unskilfully'. This
commonplace rule has been stated before in dealing with the sequence
of contraries; for all we are claiming now is that the contrary of P
shall follow the contrary of S.
Moreover, look at the modes of generation and destruction of a thing,
and at the things which tend to produce or to destroy it, both in
demolishing and in establishing a view. For those things whose modes
of generation rank among good things, are themselves also good; and if
they themselves be good, so also are their modes of generation. If, on
the other hand, their modes of generation be evil, then they
themselves also are evil. In regard to modes of destruction the
converse is true: for if the modes of destruction rank as good things,
then they themselves rank as evil things; whereas if the modes of
destruction count as evil, they themselves count as good. The same
argument applies also to things tending to produce and destroy: for
things whose productive causes are good, themselves also rank as good;
whereas if causes destructive of them are good, they themselves rank
as evil.
Part 10
Again, look at things which are like the subject in question, and see
if they are in like case; e.g. if one branch of knowledge has more
than one object, so also will one opinion; and if to possess sight be
to see, then also to possess hearing will be to hear. Likewise also in
the case of other things, both those which are and those which are
generally held to be like. The rule in question is useful for both
purposes; for if it be as stated in the case of some one like thing,
it is so with the other like things as well, whereas if it be not so
in the case of some one of them, neither is it so in the case of the
others. Look and see also whether the cases are alike as regards a
single thing and a number of things: for sometimes there is a
discrepancy. Thus, if to 'know' a thing be to 'think of' it, then also
to 'know many things' is to 'be thinking of many things'; whereas this
is not true; for it is possible to know many things but not to be
thinking of them. If, then, the latter proposition be not true,
neither was the former that dealt with a single thing, viz. that to
'know' a thing is to 'think of' it.
Moreover, argue from greater and less degrees. In regard to greater
degrees there are four commonplace rules. One is: See whether a
greater degree of the predicate follows a greater degree of the
subject: e.g. if pleasure be good, see whether also a greater pleasure
be a greater good: and if to do a wrong be evil, see whether also to
do a greater wrong is a greater evil. Now this rule is of use for both
purposes: for if an increase of the accident follows an increase of
the subject, as we have said, clearly the accident belongs; while if
it does not follow, the accident does not belong. You should establish
this by induction. Another rule is: If one predicate be attributed to
two subjects; then supposing it does not belong to the subject to