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which it is the more likely to belong, neither does it belong where it
is less likely to belong; while if it does belong where it is less
likely to belong, then it belongs as well where it is more likely.
Again: If two predicates be attributed to one subject, then if the one
which is more generally thought to belong does not belong, neither
does the one that is less generally thought to belong; or, if the one
that is less generally thought to belong does belong, so also does the
other. Moreover: If two predicates be attributed to two subjects, then
if the one which is more usually thought to belong to the one subject
does not belong, neither does the remaining predicate belong to the
remaining subject; or, if the one which is less usually thought to
belong to the one subject does belong, so too does the remaining
predicate to the remaining subject.
Moreover, you can argue from the fact that an attribute belongs, or is
generally supposed to belong, in a like degree, in three ways, viz.
those described in the last three rules given in regard to a greater
degree.' For supposing that one predicate belongs, or is supposed to
belong, to two subjects in a like degree, then if it does not belong
to the one, neither does it belong to the other; while if it belongs
to the one, it belongs to the remaining one as well. Or, supposing two
predicates to belong in a like degree to the same subject, then, if
the one does not belong, neither does the remaining one; while if the
one does belong, the remaining one belongs as well. The case is the
same also if two predicates belong in a like degree to two subjects;
for if the one predicate does not belong to the one subject, neither
does the remaining predicate belong to the remaining subject, while if
the one predicate does belong to the one subject, the remaining
predicate belongs to the remaining subject as well.
Part 11
You can argue, then, from greater or less or like degrees of truth in
the aforesaid number of ways. Moreover, you should argue from the
addition of one thing to another. If the addition of one thing to
another makes that other good or white, whereas formerly it was not
white or good, then the thing added will be white or good-it will
possess the character it imparts to the whole as well. Moreover, if an
addition of something to a given object intensifies the character
which it had as given, then the thing added will itself as well be of
that character. Likewise, also, in the case of other attributes. The
rule is not applicable in all cases, but only in those in which the
excess described as an 'increased intensity' is found to take place.
The above rule is, however, not convertible for overthrowing a view.
For if the thing added does not make the other good, it is not thereby
made clear whether in itself it may not be good: for the addition of
good to evil does not necessarily make the whole good, any more than
the addition of white to black makes the whole white.
Again, any predicate of which we can speak of greater or less degrees
belongs also absolutely: for greater or less degrees of good or of
white will not be attributed to what is not good or white: for a bad
thing will never be said to have a greater or less degree of goodness
than another, but always of badness. This rule is not convertible,
either, for the purpose of overthrowing a predication: for several
predicates of which we cannot speak of a greater degree belong
absolutely: for the term 'man' is not attributed in greater and less
degrees, but a man is a man for all that.
You should examine in the same way predicates attributed in a given
respect, and at a given time and place: for if the predicate be
possible in some respect, it is possible also absolutely. Likewise,
also, is what is predicated at a given time or place: for what is
absolutely impossible is not possible either in any respect or at any
place or time. An objection may be raised that in a given respect
people may be good by nature, e.g. they may be generous or temperately
inclined, while absolutely they are not good by nature, because no one
is prudent by nature. Likewise, also, it is possible for a
destructible thing to escape destruction at a given time, whereas it