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is not possible for it to escape absolutely. In the same way also it
is a good thing at certain places to follow see and such a diet, e.g.
in infected areas, though it is not a good thing absolutely. Moreover,
in certain places it is possible to live singly and alone, but
absolutely it is not possible to exist singly and alone. In the same
way also it is in certain places honourable to sacrifice one's father,
e.g. among the Triballi, whereas, absolutely, it is not honourable. Or
possibly this may indicate a relativity not to places but to persons:
for it is all the same wherever they may be: for everywhere it will be
held honourable among the Triballi themselves, just because they are
Triballi. Again, at certain times it is a good thing to take
medicines, e.g. when one is ill, but it is not so absolutely. Or
possibly this again may indicate a relativity not to a certain time,
but to a certain state of health: for it is all the same whenever it
occurs, if only one be in that state. A thing is 'absolutely' so which
without any addition you are prepared to say is honourable or the
contrary. Thus (e.g.) you will deny that to sacrifice one's father is
honourable: it is honourable only to certain persons: it is not
therefore honourable absolutely. On the other hand, to honour the gods
you will declare to be honourable without adding anything, because
that is honourable absolutely. So that whatever without any addition
is generally accounted to be honourable or dishonourable or anything
else of that kind, will be said to be so 'absolutely'.
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By Aristotle
Written 350 B.C.E Part 1
The question which is the more desirable, or the better, of two or
more things, should be examined upon the following lines: only first
of all it must be clearly laid down that the inquiry we are making
concerns not things that are widely divergent and that exhibit great
differences from one another (for nobody raises any doubt whether
happiness or wealth is more desirable), but things that are nearly
related and about which we commonly discuss for which of the two we
ought rather to vote, because we do not see any advantage on either
side as compared with the other. Clearly, in such cases if we can show
a single advantage, or more than one, our judgement will record our
assent that whichever side happens to have the advantage is the more
desirable.
First, then, that which is more lasting or secure is more desirable
than that which is less so: and so is that which is more likely to be
chosen by the prudent or by the good man or by the right law, or by
men who are good in any particular line, when they make their choice
as such, or by the experts in regard to any particular class of
things; i.e. either whatever most of them or what all of them would
choose; e.g. in medicine or in carpentry those things are more
desirable which most, or all, doctors would choose; or, in general,
whatever most men or all men or all things would choose, e.g. the
good: for everything aims at the good. You should direct the argument
you intend to employ to whatever purpose you require. Of what is
'better' or 'more desirable' the absolute standard is the verdict of
the better science, though relatively to a given individual the
standard may be his own particular science.
In the second place, that which is known as 'an x' is more desirable
than that which does not come within the genus 'x'-e.g. justice than a
just man; for the former falls within the genus 'good', whereas the
other does not, and the former is called 'a good', whereas the latter
is not: for nothing which does not happen to belong to the genus in
question is called by the generic name; e.g. a 'white man' is not 'a
colour'. Likewise also in other cases.
Also, that which is desired for itself is more desirable than that
which is desired for something else; e.g. health is more desirable
than gymnastics: for the former is desired for itself, the latter for
something else. Also, that which is desirable in itself is more
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