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desirable than what is desirable per accidens; e.g. justice in our
friends than justice in our enemies: for the former is desirable in
itself, the latter per accidens: for we desire that our enemies should
be just per accidens, in order that they may do us no harm. This last
principle is the same as the one that precedes it, with, however, a
different turn of expression. For we desire justice in our friends for
itself, even though it will make no difference to us, and even though
they be in India; whereas in our enemies we desire it for something
else, in order that they may do us no harm.
Also, that which is in itself the cause of good is more desirable than
what is so per accidens, e.g. virtue than luck (for the former in
itself, and the latter per accidens, the cause of good things), and so
in other cases of the same kind. Likewise also in the case of the
contrary; for what is in itself the cause of evil is more
objectionable than what is so per accidens, e.g. vice and chance: for
the one is bad in itself, whereas chance is so per accidens.
Also, what is good absolutely is more desirable than what is good for
a particular person, e.g. recovery of health than a surgical
operation; for the former is good absolutely, the latter only for a
particular person, viz. the man who needs an operation. So too what is
good by nature is more desirable than the good that is not so by
nature, e.g. justice than the just man; for the one is good by nature,
whereas in the other case the goodness is acquired. Also the attribute
is more desirable which belongs to the better and more honourable
subject, e.g. to a god rather than to a man, and to the soul rather
than to the body. So too the property of the better thing is better
than the property of the worse; e.g. the property of God than the
property of man: for whereas in respect of what is common in both of
them they do not differ at all from each other, in respect of their
properties the one surpasses the other. Also that is better which is
inherent in things better or prior or more honourable: thus (e.g.)
health is better than strength and beauty: for the former is inherent
in the moist and the dry, and the hot and the cold, in fact in all the
primary constituents of an animal, whereas the others are inherent in
what is secondary, strength being a feature of the sinews and bones,
while beauty is generally supposed to consist in a certain symmetry of
the limbs. Also the end is generally supposed to be more desirable
than the means, and of two means, that which lies nearer the end. In
general, too, a means directed towards the end of life is more
desirable than a means to anything else, e.g. that which contributes
to happiness than that which contributes to prudence. Also the
competent is more desirable than the incompetent. Moreover, of two
productive agents that one is more desirable whose end is better;
while between a productive agent and an end we can decide by a
proportional sum whenever the excess of the one end over the other is
greater than that of the latter over its own productive means: e.g.
supposing the excess of happiness over health to be greater than that
of health over what produces health, then what produces happiness is
better than health. For what produces happiness exceeds what produces
health just as much as happiness exceeds health. But health exceeds
what produces health by a smaller amount; ergo, the excess of what
produces happiness over what produces health is greater than that of
health over what produces health. Clearly, therefore, what produces
happiness is more desirable than health: for it exceeds the same
standard by a greater amount. Moreover, what is in itself nobler and
more precious and praiseworthy is more desirable than what is less so,
e.g. friendship than wealth, and justice than strength. For the former
belong in themselves to the class of things precious and praiseworthy,
while the latter do so not in themselves but for something else: for
no one prizes wealth for itself but always for something else, whereas
we prize friendship for itself, even though nothing else is likely to
come to us from it.
Part 2
Moreover, whenever two things are very much like one another, and we